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ABSTRACT

With the pervasive use of mobile devices, social media, home assistants, and smart
devices, the idea of individual privacy is fading. More than ever, the public is giving
up personal information in order to take advantage of what is now considered every day
conveniences and ignoring the consequences. Even seemingly harmless information is
making headlines for its unauthorized use (18). Among this data is user trajectory data
which can be described as a user’s location information over a time period (6). This data
is generated whenever users access their devices to record their location, query the location
of a point of interest, query directions to get to a location, request services to come to their
location, and many other applications. This data could be used by a malicious adversary
to track a user’s movements, location, daily patterns, and learn details personal to the user.
While the best course of action would be to hide this information entirely, this data can be
used for many beneficial purposes as well. Emergency vehicles could be more efficiently
routed based on trajectory patterns, businesses could make intelligent marketing or building
decisions, and users themselves could benefit by taking advantage of more conveniences.
There are several challenges to publishing this data while also preserving user privacy. For
example, while location data has good utility, users expect their data to be private. For real
world applications, users generate many terabytes of data every day. To process this volume
of data for later use and anonymize it in order to hide individual user identities, this thesis
presents an efficient algorithm to change the processing time for anonymization from days,
as seen in (20), to a matter of minutes or hours. We cannot focus just on location data,
however. Social media has a great many uses, one of which being the sharing of images.
Privacy cannot stop with location, but must reach to other data as well. This thesis addresses
the issue of image privacy in this work, as often images can be even more sensitive than
location.

v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to my advisor,
Dr. Dan Lin, for her support, knowledge, and encouragement during my Ph.D and related
research. I am grateful for her patience which has guided me throughout my research.
Aside from my advisor, I want to express my sincere gratitude to the rest of my
committee: Dr. Daniel Tauritz, Dr. Jennifer Leopold, Dr.Yanjie Fu, and Dr. Donald Wunsch. Their comments, suggestions, recommendations, and encouragement have contributed
greatly to my success and I could not imagine having made it without them. My research
went in directions I didn’t imagine because of their questions and guidance and for this I
am grateful.
Finally, I would like to thank the Computer Science Department, including faculty
and staff. They have provided me with many opportunities to grow as a person and a student.
They have worked tirelessly to make sure I had everything I needed to succeed and I could
not have done it without them.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PUBLICATION DISSERTATION OPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
SECTION
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2. LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.1. PRIVACY PRESERVING TRAJECTORY PUBLISHING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.2. PROCESSING LOCATION DATA IN PARALLEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.3. PRIVACY VS UTILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4. PRIVACY POLICY RECOMMENDATION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5. PRIVACY BREACH FROM FRIEND-TO-FRIEND SHARING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6. IMAGE POLICY CONFLICTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
PAPER
I. A PARALLEL ALGORITHM FOR ANONYMIZING LARGE-SCALE TRAJECTORY DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vii
2.

3.

PROBLEM STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.

DATA REPRESENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2.2.

PRIVACY DEFINITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.3.

PERFORMANCE METRICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

THE PROPOSED MELT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.

AN OVERVIEW OF MELT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.2.

ROAD MAP PARTITIONING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.3.

PARALLEL TRAJECTORY ANONYMIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3.4.
4.

5.

3.3.1.

Round 1: Trajectory Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.3.2.

Round 2: Pre-Classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3.3.3.

Round 3: Melt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

PRIVACY PRESERVATION WITH WITH VARYING k . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

SYSTEM ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.

PRIVACY AND UTILITY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

4.2.

COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.1.

Round 1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

4.2.2.

Round 2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

4.2.3.

Round 3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.2.4.

Overall Complexity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.2.5.

Comparison to Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

PERFORMANCE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.

EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

5.2.

EFFECT OF MAP PARTITIONING ON ANONYMIZATION
ACCURACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5.3.

EFFECT OF THE ANONYMIZATION PARAMETER k ON
DATA UTILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5.4.

SCALABILITY TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

viii

6.

5.5.

EFFECT OF MAP TOPOLOGY ON EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.6.

EFFECT OF USER DEFINED k ON ANONYMIZATION ACCURACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
II. REMIND: RISK ESTIMATION MECHANISM FOR IMAGES IN NETWORK
DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

2.

PROBLEM STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

3.

THE REMIND SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.

3.1.

PROPAGATION CHAIN MODELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

3.2.

DISCLOSURE PROBABILITY CALCULATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

3.3.

PRIVACY HARMONIZATION AMONG MULTIPLE USERS . . . . . 82

3.4.

POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

EXPERIMENTAL STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.

4.2.

5.

USER STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1.1.

Setup and Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

4.1.2.

Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

EFFICIENCY STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.1.

Effect of the Number of Propagation Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

4.2.2.

Effect of the Number of Friends in the Initial Sharing List

4.2.3.

Effect of the Sharing Convergence Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

91

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

ix
SECTION
3. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
APPENDICES
A. AUTHOR PUBLICATIONS LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B. MELT COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS EXPANDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

x
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

Page

PAPER I
1.

(a)Naive map partitioning approaches break up trajectories into small segments
which will lower data utility.(b) Ideal partitioning to keep trajectories whole. . . . . 18

2.

An Example of the Inference-Route Problem with u4 ’s location inferred. . . . . . . . . 21

3.

An overall representation of the architecture of our approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4.

In the second reducer phase, instead of using one large c-Tree, we break
off similar branches into smaller chunks to benefit from map-reduce’s batch
processing in the reducers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

5.

At a k value of 0.5% we are no longer able to identify the original trajectories
with at least 65% confidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

6.

Comparison of K vs Utility showing they are measured differently, and therefore cannot be immediately assumed to be inversely proportional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

7.

Anonymization accuracy when dividing the map into different number of
partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

8.

Anonymization accuracy when varying k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

9.

The accuracy of the data drops significantly when k represents more than 1%
of the data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

10.

Effect of data size on anonymization time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

11.

CPU time comparison on real datasets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

12.

Effect of data size on anonymization accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

13.

Effect of map topology on anaonymization time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

14.

Precision and recall for different map topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

PAPER II
1.

An Example of Privacy Breach Due to Image Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

2.

An Overview of REMIND System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

3.

An Example of Image Sharing Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

xi
4.

Single Photo Propagation Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

5.

A Generic Photo Propagation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6.

User uo ’s Personal Image Sharing Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

7.

Sharing Scenario Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

8.

Sharing Scenario Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

9.

An Example of Sharing Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

10.

An Example of Probability Serialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

11.

Effect of the Number of the Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

12.

Effect of the Size of the Initial Sharing List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

13.

Effect of Sharing Convergence Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

xii
LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

PAPER I
1.

The number of trajectories and the corresponding file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2.

Real trajectory datasets tested for efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3.

Number of trajectories in the anonymization results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4.

The anonymization time using the centralized approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5.

Change of anonymization accuracy when using individual k parameters . . . . . . . . . 57

PAPER II
1.

User Response to Different Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

2.

Real Social Network Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

SECTION

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990’s, social media has grown in popularity and has now become a
significant part of everyday users’ lives. Users are now able to share pictures, their locations,
information about their lives, and other data with hundreds of other users without leaving
their own home. For some, this has enriched lives and connections with people so much that
it is deemed a necessity. This sharing of data has led to new challenges in terms of privacy,
however. Before, when someone shared information, it spread to local communities and
was unlikely to do much harm to that person. Now, however, information shared reaches
hundreds of people in seconds and can spread to millions in a matter of hours. Information
that once was fairly harmless can now destroy lives (7). In addition to social media, smart
phones have risen in popularity and use since their debut in the early 2000’s. Over half
a billion mobile devices were added to networks in 2013 (51). With these phones, users
no longer need to stop at a computer to share with their friends. Instead, they carry their
computer with them, snap pictures and send messages instantly, play social games with
countless people anywhere in the world from any location, and so much more. We are more
connected than ever.
74% of adults use their smart phones to get directions and other information based
on their current location (51). In a survey completed in 2018 (31), nearly all users have at
least one social media account, with many having multiple. 30% of adults with an account
on social media sites say they have at least one of those accounts include their current
location in their posts (61). Even if we ignore hand held devices, as many as 96% of cars
produced in 2013 are built with event recorders that include GPS.
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Location information can be used by an adversary to track a user’s movements, infer
work locations and other habits, and even locate sensitive targets such as children, elderly,
or government officials (20). As of now, this information is accessed and sold at alarming
rates (6; 18). The immediate solution is to not make location data available at all. This poses
two issues however. First, in order for some convenient applications to work, locations need
to be sent to a server to be part of some sort of analysis. It is difficult to think of a GPS app
functioning without location information. This information produces income revenue to
telecommunication companies. Even though the data can be limited by not being available
to the public, data breaches happen with alarming frequency (10). The frequency in which
locations are collected is also alarming. A politician in Germany went to court to find out
how often and what kind of data was collected by his cell phone company. The results
were staggering. In just a six month period, his coordinates were recorded and stored over
35,000 times (4). Users are becoming increasingly cautious to trust that their data is being
kept safe.
The second reason to keep location data available is that the data is very useful for
analysis and predictions. With a large amount of user trajectory data, we could determine the
best route for emergency vehicles during a specific time period, assist with traffic congestion
prevention, infrastructure and evacuation planning, analysis of social behavior to provide
more conveniences, advertising campaigns, and control of spread of diseases. If the data
could safely be used, it has great potential for both private and public projects.
Solving the challenges of using location information is not a trivial task. The simple
solution to protect users and still use the data is to hide their user id’s and other identifiable
information. The issue, however, is that even data related to the user can be used to identify
them if used together. For example, if we were to hide a user’s name and address from
a dataset and use zip code, birth date, and gender, we would not be able to identify the
user from any of these data categories individually. Many people in an area will share any
single pieces of this information. However, used together, we could infer who the data
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is taken from. These are called quasi − identi f ier s and are not sufficient to protect user
privacy entirely (56). Instead, we would need to completely anonymize all of the data. This
introduces another challenge, the size of the data. Mobile device users generate 7.2 EB of
data every month, and is projected to grow to 49 EB per month by 2021 (51), and most of
the data contains location information. The amount of information is exceeding the data
management and analysis ability of existing traditional database type storage systems (15).
While there has been research conducted to anonymize trajectories to address the privacy
concern considering small data sets, there has been limited work on anonymizing large-scale
datasets. Some of these methods proposed are k-anonymization, spatial-cloaking and data
transformation (1; 4; 8; 16; 17; 19; 20; 22; 35; 39; 40; 41).
Unfortunately, few prior works addresses the scalability issue while keeping the
privacy and high utility of the trajectory data, which is a newly occurring problem brought
by the information explosion, i.e., the current need of dealing with exabytes of trajectory
data. A naive approach to this problem would be to take a centralized approach and simply
write it into a distributed framework such as Hadoop or Spark. However, there are additional
challenges related to the distributed approach that create bottlenecks and significantly slow
down processing. In addition, centralized approaches ported into a distributed environment
often leads to significant errors and data loss, which undermines the need for accurate data
utility (54).
In this thesis, the author presents a novel solution to this problem called MELT
(53; 54). In this work, we present a three round map-reduce algorithm that guarantees strict
k-anonymity on a dataset of user trajectory data in a fraction of the time it takes centralized
approaches. This means that no user will have their data published for use anywhere unless
there are at least k − 1 other users with identical trajectories. The intuition behind this
approach is that if there are 100K users sharing the same trajectory, it will be impossible
to pick a particular person out among them. In order to maintain the utility of the data,
however, we need to retain as many trajectories as possible by performing transformations
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on the trajectories while also keeping those transformations minimal in order to keep the
data as close to the original as possible. We also need to prevent inference of user identities
through low frequency traveled routes. We present a way to achieve complete anonymity
and maintain high data utility.
As stated earlier users are cautious when trusting their privacy to someone else.
Rather than force every user to depend on a global k value to achieve k-anonymity, users
would be more trusting if they could define their own level of privacy. The author presents
an extension to MELT where we add the capability of users to define their own k value and
base the final result off the more strict requirement (54). We show that this addition requires
alteration of the original algorithm but adds little complexity change and utility loss.
In addition to adding the ability for users to define their own privacy requirement, we
also address the idea of privacy vs utility. In most works, the two are considered inversely
dependent on one another. That is, if we have high privacy, we have low utility and vice
versa. For example, if we want 100% user privacy, we hide all of their data. With no
data published, users are completely protected but there is no data utility as it cannot be
used. However, if we publish all of the user’s data we get 100% data utility, as it all can
be used, but users have no privacy. In spite of this, for all cases in between, the two are
not necessarily dependent. In a recent paper, (52), the authors claim that since privacy
and utility are measured differently and compared to different datasets, the two cannot be
referred to as dependent. Using observations from their work, we analyze our own solution
and show that we maintain both high data utility and user privacy.
User privacy in social media is not limited to location data. Another source of data
sensitivity is user images. Based on a user survey, almost every user using social media
posts images of their personal life (31). With a single image, information about a user’s
home, children, work, or other private information can potentially be leaked. Still, many
users prefer to share their images, though often with only certain people. This has been
addressed in a limited capacity with many social media sites allowing the creation of groups
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for users to share certain information with, such as family, friends, work, etc. Maintaining
groups can be tedious at best. Within family we can have close family and extended. A user
may want to share with all family except one person or perhaps to only best friends. Creating
groups to share to the right users can become inconvenient and cause users to not see the
service as easy to use and therefore stop using it or ignore the the privacy implications. In
addition, though images are shared to a specific person, it is often impossible to tell who
that person will share to or who will see the image later. If a user shares a party picture with
her sister, who is married to a person that has a friend who works with the original user,
then that user’s supervisors could see the picture. This may not be in the best interest of the
user. Or perhaps the user shared a picture of her children to her sister who has a friend who
is a friend of someone who may be an unknown predator.
In this thesis, the author presents REMIND, an algorithm designed to calculate the
probability of an image reaching unintended audiences and make suggestions on who to
share an image with to limit the risk that the image will reach those audiences (31). In
addition, it prevents users not in the chosen group from viewing the image based on the
preferences of everyone in the photo. Finally, based on user history and choices, it develops
policies for new images being shared based on who is in the images so that share filtering
becomes automatic and requires little to no user input. Not only does it address the current
user, it addresses everyone in the image. If a user shares a picture of themselves and their
best friend, it considers the policies and restrictions of the best friend as well. Not only do
we protect the privacy of the user, but also other users in the same image and with little
interference from the users. This makes sharing images convenient and maintains their
privacy choices. When combined with social media, users will be able to share their images
without worrying about tedious group sharing policies and their privacy will be protected
in the background.
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The current growth of social media, mobile devices, and connectivity between
people means user privacy is a concern that will only continue to grow. The work presented
in this thesis is a strong contribution to protecting users while they enjoy these conveniences
while also making use of the data to improve physical safety and improve overall quality
of life. The author demonstrates that there can be a balance between user privacy and data
utility and that instead of fighting against user data being used, we can embrace using the
data safely.
This thesis formally presents two major pieces of work: (i) A Parallel Algorithm
for Anonymizing Large-Scale Trajectory data which includes earlier work presented at the
Mobile Data Management conference as MELT: Mapreduce-based Efficient Large Scale
Trajectory Anonymization, and (ii) REMIND: Risk Estimation Mechanism for Images
in Network Distribution. In addition, as summarized in Appendix A, these works are
supplemented by additional publications by the author.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. PRIVACY PRESERVING TRAJECTORY PUBLISHING
There have been many centralized approaches for trajectory anonymization. Most
of them (17; 19; 22; 35; 39; 40; 41) output anonymized trajectories in the form of cloaking
regions or centers of clusters. For example, in (19), the spatial-temporal cloaking technique
is applied to generate cloaking regions covering segments of trajectories. In (1), Abul et
al. consider a trajectory as a cylindrical volume where the radius represents the location
imprecision. They then perturb and cluster trajectories with overlapping volumes to ensure
that each released trajectory volume encloses at least k − 1 other trajectories to achieve
k-anonymity. Similarly, in (35), each trajectory is an ordered set of spatio-temporal 3D
volumes. In (34), Monreale et al. cluster trajectories and transform them into a sequence of
centroids of Voronoi cells. In these approaches, the anonymized trajectories do not follow
the road network constraints. They can be located even in the middle of two parallel roads,
and hence, are not beneficial for traffic analysis on individual roads, which our approach
aims to achieve. Also, GPS systems are becoming more and more accurate. A cellphone
can tell a person’s location within a few feet, making methods such as these unusable in
practice.
In (11), trajectories are clustered based on a distance function and then a location time
triple in an anonymized trajectory is replaced by an existing triple with close proximity in the
original trajectory to satisfy k-anonymity. However, two triples, though close in proximity,
may belong to two different roads making it easy for the adversary to identify fake trajectories
given that the road map is publicly known. In (1), Abul et al. used a coarsening strategy
which removes one or more spatial points in a trajectory to achieve anonymization. An
anonymized trajectory may contain disconnected paths. This is different from our approach

8
which preserves continuous trajectories based on road-network information. Similarly, in
(8), Chen et al. adopt a greedy algorithm to suppress locations in the trajectories to achieve
anonymity. However, using suppression alone may decrease the utility of the anonymization
results. They did not provide any experimental study to prove the effectiveness of the
approach. Unlike the previous works which are based on the similarity of trajectories,
Yarovoy et al. (56) group trajectories based on so-called quasi-identifiers, which are hard
to be selected in practice. Anonymization using these quasi-identifiers is nearly impossible
as knowledge of more than one of these can lead an adversary to infer information about a
user.
Rather than representing trajectories as a set of coordinates, some works (34) represent trajectories as landmarks or locations of interests. However, these kind of trajectories
provide mainly moving patterns rather than real trajectories as considered in our work. In
addition, a few works (1; 8) make the assumption that attackers have certain prior knowledge
and take such prior knowledge as input for anonymization, while our anonymization is more
general and does not need such assumptions.
Finally, we would like to discuss the more closely related work (20; 38; 40) which
generate anonymized trajectories following the road-networks. In (38), Pensa et al. proposed
a prefix-tree based anonymization algorithm which guarantees k-anonymity of the published
trajectories in a way that no trajectories with support less than k will be published. Later,
Gurung et al. (20) identified a so-called inference-route problem in the anonymization
results produced by (38), and proposed an improved anonymization algorithm that achieves
stronger privacy guarantee. Our proposed parallel trajectory anonymization algorithm is
developed based on this latest centralized trajectory anonymization strategy (20) while
addressing new challenges raised by the scalability and the MapReduce technique. In
(39; 40; 41), Poulis et al. have proposed a cluster based anonymization which is similar, but
they do not address scalability and also suffer from the inference route problem as defined
in (20) Most recently, He et al. (23) has proposed a method to protect user privacy by
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not publishing the real data generated by users. Instead, they take samples of real datasets
and then generate a synthetic trajectory dataset based on information from the real data,
probabilities, and noise added. While this does protect user privacy, it causes a loss of utility
which the authors don’t analyze. Additionally, there is still the inference route problem later
discussed in Section 3. Our solution is proven to retain utility in large scale while avoiding
the inference route problem. Additionally, MELT allows the user to select the level of
privacy, k, and thus adjust the trade-off between privacy and utility. This is something not
allowed in (23).
In addition, an overview of our work was introduced briefly in (53). In the journal
version (54), we have made the following new contributions: our new algorithm allows each
user to define his/her own privacy requirement; we conducted detailed analysis regarding the
trade-off between privacy and utility as well as complexity; we added a detailed description
and examples for the proposed algorithms; we implemented our work in both Hadoop and
Spark.

2.2. PROCESSING LOCATION DATA IN PARALLEL
Many works (59) have been proposed to utilize map-reduce to perform data mining,
pattern classifications, document retrieval, etc., in large-scale datasets. However, there are
very few works on large-scale trajectory data processing. Yang et al. (21) proposed a
method called TRUSTER for query processing over trajectory data using MapReduce. In
(29; 43), MapReduce-based algorithms have been proposed to handle trajectory matching.
Eldawy and Mokbel (12) proposed SpatialHadoop as an extension to MapReduce to provide
support for spatial data management. However, to the best of our knowledge, while these
works address indexing and querying trajectories very well, none of the existing works
address the issue of anonymizing a large volume of trajectory data.
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Aside from Hadoop, there are other parallel approaches. In the most recent work
(44; 45), Shang et al. find similar trajectories and group them together in parallel. Compared
to their work which requires multiple passes over the data, our approach is capable of
scanning the dataset only once and therefore further reducing the computation time and
increasing utility.

2.3. PRIVACY VS UTILITY
In a recent paper (52) on the discussion of privacy versus utility in regards to the
anonymization of data, Li and Li discuss the trade-offs while measuring privacy versus
utility. In many works, privacy and utility are viewed as dependent on one another. For
example, if we took the extreme example and hide all user data, therefore achieving 100%
user privacy, we also have zero utility as the data cannot be used for anything. However, if
we publish 100% of the user data, then we can say we have 100% data utility but no user
privacy. The authors of (52) claim that for all other circumstances however, privacy and
utility are measured differently and against different datasets, and therefore should not be
compared to one another as though dependent. They also discuss the way privacy and utility
should be measured to have an accurate analysis. Using their observations and calculations,
we analyze our own work and give detailed examples.

2.4. PRIVACY POLICY RECOMMENDATION SYSTEMS
Our work shares similar goals of privacy protection with existing works on privacy
policy recommendation systems, privacy risk estimation and privacy violation detection in
social networks. However, our proposed probability-based approach is unique that has not
been explored in the past. More details are elaborated in the following.
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There have been many privacy policy recommendation systems (2; 5; 13; 33; 37; 47).
They typically utilize certain types of machine-learning algorithms to analyze users’ profiles,
historical privacy preferences, image content and meta data, and/or social circles, in order to
predict privacy policies. Instead of relying on social circles and clustering social contexts,
another thread of work looks into the image content and metadata directly (26; 46; 49; 58).
In order to even better capture the users’ privacy preferences, there is a new trend of
hybrid approaches which combine knowledge learned from both social contexts and the
image content (48; 57). For example, Squicciarini et al.(48) propose to utilize community
practices for the cold start problem in new users and image classification based approaches
for users with long privacy configuration history. Yu et al.(57) consider both content
sensitiveness of the images being shared and trustworthiness of the users being granted to
see the images during the fine-grained privacy settings for social image sharing.

2.5. PRIVACY BREACH FROM FRIEND-TO-FRIEND SHARING
Since our work considers the privacy breach caused by friend-to-friend sharing,
we review works that also examine this aspect. Akcor et al.(3) propose a risk model that
estimates the risk of adding a stranger as a new friend. They cluster users based on their
profile features, privacy settings and mutual friends. Our approach is different from theirs
in terms of both goals and approaches. We aim to estimate the risk of an image may be seen
by an unwanted person, while they aim to estimate whether a stranger could be added as a
new friend. We define probability models while they use clustering techniques. Another
work on malicious user identification is by Laleh et al.(27) who analyze social graphs using
the assumption that malicious users show some common features on the topology of their
social graphs. This work is also different from ours regarding goals and approaches. More
related to our work, Kafali et al.(25) propose a privacy violation detection system called
PROTOSS which checks and predicts if the users’ privacy agreements may be violated due
to the friends of friends sharing. Their approach is based on semantic checking and rule
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reasoning. The potential limitation is that the privacy violation prediction is likely to report
lots of false positives in a well connected social network since the system preassumes that
the sharing would happen as long as the two users are connected in the social network.
In our work, our proposed probability model not only models social network topology but
also the image sharing statistics to provide more refined and accurate predictions. Later,
Kokciyan et al. (36) also propose a monitoring approach which utilizes agents to keep
checking whether the current sharing activity (e.g., by a friend of the owner) violates the
privacy requirements of the content owner. Unlike this approach that relies on agents to
continuously monitor the sharing events, our approach aims to prevents the potential privacy
breach at the beginning of the sharing.

2.6. IMAGE POLICY CONFLICTS
Lastly, there have been works on resolving image policy conflicts among multiple
users. Such and Criado (50) look at conflicting policies between users in images for when
an image is to be shared. They propose a set of concession rules that model how users
would actually negotiate to reach the common ground. In addition, there have also been
general approaches for integrating access control policies of collaborating parties (42) which
however requires the users to clearly specify how these policies should be combined.
Compared to all the existing works on image privacy preservation, our work distinguishes itself in two main aspects. First, it is probably the first time that the large volume
of image sharing statistic data being considered and sophisticated probability models being
built for privacy risk estimation. Second, compared to existing approaches which usually
recommend policies based on relatively fuzzy logics, our system offers a direct and quantitative view of the risk of sharing so that the users could make more informed decisions
regarding the image sharing. That is, we calculate, within a social network of varying
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size, the probability that different users will be able to view an image if one particular user
decides to share it. In this way, it gives users an insight into just how vulnerable their photo
is, and the probability someone they do not desire to view their photo will end up seeing it.
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ABSTRACT
With the proliferation of location-based services enabled by a large number of
mobile devices and applications, the quantity of location data, such as trajectories collected
by service providers, is gigantic. If these datasets could be published, they will be valuable
assets to various service providers to explore business opportunities, to study commuter
behavior for better transport management, which in turn benefits the general public for
day to day commute. However, there are two major concerns that considerably limit the
availability and the usage of these trajectory datasets. The first is the threat to individual
privacy as users’ trajectories may be misused to discover sensitive information, such as home
locations, their children’s school locations, or social information like habits or relationships.
The other concern is the ability to analyze the exabytes of location data in a timely manner.
Although there have been trajectory anonymization approaches proposed in the past to
mitigate privacy concerns. None of these prior works address the scalability issue since it
is a newly occurring problem brought by the significantly increasing adoption of locationbased services. In this paper, we conquer these two challenges by designing a novel parallel
trajectory anonymization algorithm that achieves scalability, strong privacy protection and
high utility rate of the anonymized trajectory datasets. We have conducted extensive
experiments using MapReduce and Spark on real maps with different topologies, and
our results prove both effectiveness and efficiency when compared with the centralized
approaches.
Keywords: Trajectory anonymization, Large-scale, Divide and conquer, MapReduce

1. INTRODUCTION
One of the fastest growing trends in mobile technology is the use of location-based
services for applications such as social networking, vehicle tracking, and targeted advertising. As reported by Census, more than 471,000 people commute into Los Angeles county

16
everyday which results in more than 10 million trajectories each month (9). According to
Cisco, global mobile data traffic has reached 7.2 exabytes a month and is increasing rapidly
(51). In 2013, 526 million mobile devices were added to cellular and WiFi networks,
including a large increase in data usage for location-based mobile applications. Currently,
74% of adults use their smart phones to get directions and other information based on their
current location. 30% of adults with an account on social media sites say they have at least
one of those accounts include their current location in their posts (61). Even if we ignore
hand held devices, as many as 96% of cars produced in 2013 are built with event recorders
that include GPS. As a result, a huge amount of location information has been collected and
stored for analytics.
These collected location data have great potential for statistical usage in various
applications such as traffic congestion prevention, infrastructure and evacuation planning,
analysis of social behavior, advertising campaign, and control of spread of diseases. While
the benefits provided by location datasets are indisputable, many challenges remain to be
addressed to actually realize the benefits. One critical challenge is how to ease customers’
worries on location privacy (30) when they are told their location data have been collected
and may be used for analysis. A politician in Germany went to court to find out how
much and what kind of data was collected by his cell phone company. The results were
staggering. In just a six month period, his coordinates were recorded and stored 35,000
times (4). Without a strong privacy guarantee, cautious customers will soon be reluctant to
subscribe to location-based services. To address the privacy concern, several methods have
been proposed such as k-anonymization, spatial-cloaking and data transformation (1; 4; 8;
16; 17; 19; 20; 22; 35; 39; 40; 41). Unfortunately, none of the prior works addresses the
scalability issue which is a newly occurring problem brought by the information explosion,
i.e., the current need of dealing with exabytes of location data compared to only millions of
data in the past.
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In this paper, we propose a novel parallel trajectory anonymization algorithm under
the map-reduce (14) programming paradigm, called MELT, which encloses the following
four features: Mapreduce-based, Efficient, Large-scale Trajectories, and “melting" the
trajectories for anonymization to preserve their privacy. We present our algorithms by
following the MapReduce programming paradigm since it clearly exemplifies the divide
and conquer spirit which is heavily used in our proposed parallel algorithm.
It is not a trivial task to convert existing centralized anonymization approaches to
a parallel version. To better understand the challenge, let us look at the following naive
solutions. A common approach for handling a large-scale dataset is to partition the big
trajectory dataset into many small datasets and then anonymize individual small datasets
in parallel using the existing centralized approach. For dataset partitioning, there are two
straightforward methods. One is to partition the road map vertically (or horizontally)
into equal-width stripes, and the other is to partition the map into grids of equal-size
cells. Then, anonymize trajectories falling in each partition separately. However, such
partitioning of trajectory datasets can easily split a single trajectory into multiple segments
as shown in Figure 1(a) where solid lines indicate trajectories and dashed lines indicate
partitioning. As a result, groups of popular trajectories that are across multiple partitions
will be treated separately, which could severely lower the utility of the anonymized data.
This is because some trajectories will be anonymized segment by segment rather than
being considered as a whole. The anonymization results may contain disconnected or
shorter trajectories which would have lower data utility rate compared to that produced
by the original centralized approach that directly works on the entire dataset. Moreover,
anonymizing partial trajectories can introduce additional privacy breach, called inferenceroute problems as elaborated later.
An ideal case is to have the map partitions match the natural clusters of trajectories as
shown in Figure 1(b) so that the quality of the anonymization results will be as close as that
obtained from the centralized approach and original data. To achieve this, one may think of
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(a) Vertical Partitioning

(b) Ideal Partitioning

Figure 1. (a)Naive map partitioning approaches break up trajectories into small segments
which will lower data utility.(b) Ideal partitioning to keep trajectories whole.

using existing trajectory clustering algorithms (24) to get the map partitions. However, this
would not work either because clustering algorithms typically requires scanning the dataset
multiple times. Multiple scanning of exabytes of trajectory data is very time and resource
consuming, and thus it may not be practical. Instead, we expect to scan the dataset at most
once.
To overcome the aforementioned challenges, in this paper, our proposed MELT
algorithm makes the following new contributions:
• We propose a dynamic data partitioning algorithm that automatically adapts to the
distribution of trajectories and partitions the map to capture the natural clusters of
trajectories.
• We propose three rounds of map-reduce processes that fully parallelize the conventional trajectory anonymization process within a single scan of the dataset.
• We ensure that the anonymization results achieve k-anonymity, inference free, and
high data utility rate. That is, any trajectory in the published anonymization results
will have at least k − 1 other identical trajectories, and no further information can be
inferred from analyzing and comparing trajectories in the anonymization results.
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• We analyze the trade-off between privacy and data utility and also conduct extensive
experiments on real road maps using Hadoop and Spark. The experimental results
demonstrate that our approach is capable of efficiently handling large-scale datasets
that cannot be processed by the centralized approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally presents our
problem statement. Section 3 elaborates the detailed algorithms of our proposed MELT.
Section 4 analyzes the trade-off between privacy and data utility. Section 5 reports the
experimental study.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this work, we aim to anonymize large-scale trajectory datasets in parallel while
maintaining high data utility.

2.1. DATA REPRESENTATION
Following the same setting as that in (20), the road network is modeled as a directed
graph, where each edge corresponds to a road with objects moving in one direction, and
each node represents an intersection. Raw data collected by location-based applications
contains their user information as a three-tuple hI D, loc, ti, where I D is the user ID the
user’s location, loc which corresponds to a GPS coordinate at an intersection, at timestamp
t, respectively. Each road segment between intersections is assigned a road id ri . The
anonymization is carried out on the set of trajectories (Definition 1) within the same time
interval tint to preserve the time relationship among trajectories.
Definition 1 (Trajectory): User u’s trajectory is represented as Tr ju ={r1, r2, ..., rn }, where
r1 , ..., rn are IDs of roads visited by u in sequential time order.
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After anonymization, the output dataset contains information in the form of:
hr1 dir1, r2 dir2 ..., rn dirn, supporti
where ri is a road id in the representative trajectory of nodes visited by users, diri is the
direction the user traveled on ri , and support is the number of users who have traveled the
entire representative trajectory. Such representation is sufficient to derive trajectories or
traffic flow information.

2.2. PRIVACY DEFINITION
We aim to achieve strict k-anonymity. That is, no trajectory will be published unless
at least k − 1 other trajectories are identical. The intuition is that if k is sufficiently high, it
is impossible to identify an individual user among k identical users.
Definition 2 (Strict k-anonymity over trajectories): Let Tr j be a trajectory. We say Tr j
satisfies strict k-anonymity if Support(Trj) is no less than k, where Support(Trj) is the
number of identical trajectories matching Tr j.
Trajectories that satisfy strict k-anonymity do not contain any inference-route problem (20). The notions regarding the inference-route problem are given below.
Definition 3 (Road frequency): Let W be a time interval, and let k be a threshold. We
say a road is a frequent road if the number of objects moving along one direction on this
road is no less than k within time interval W. We call the number of moving objects as the
frequency of the road.
Definition 4 (Inference route): Let Υ be an intersection of roads r1 , ..., rm , and let Ui+ ,
Ui− be the sets of objects moving toward and outward Υ on road ri (1 ≤ i ≤ m) during W,
respectively. If ∃ Ui+ , U −j , |Ui+ | ≥ k, |U −j | ≥ k, and (0< |Ui+ −U −j | < k or 0< |U −j −Ui+ | < k),
then we say Υ has an inference-route problem.
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Figure 2. An Example of the Inference-Route Problem with u4 ’s location inferred.

In the above definition, the constraints |Ui+ | ≥ k, |U −j | ≥ k ensure that only frequent
road segments are considered, and (0< |Ui+ − U −j | < k or 0< |U −j − Ui+ | < k) check if
there is a chance for a road segment to be inferred. To have a better understanding, let us
consider a toy example in Figure 2 which shows four users leaving their homes (I, J, K, A)
for work. Let k be 3, which means a trajectory can be published if at least three users have
this trajectory. If trajectories are anonymized segment by segment due to map partitioning
(illustrated by dashed dotted lines), the anonymization output will contain two roads r1 and
r2 with supports 4 and 3 respectively, and has the following the inference-route problem.
Specifically, if an adversary observes that Alice passes by road r1 and r3 every weekday,
then Bob can infer that u4 is Alice’s ID from the published anonymized trajectory dataset
because Alice is the only one who may enter road r3 by comparing the set of anonymous IDs
in the published road segment. Using this ID, the adversary would be able to track Alice’s
other movement. According to Definition 4, node B is an intersection of three roads. On
road r1 , Ur+1 = {u1 ,u2 ,u3 , u4 }; on road r2 , Ur−2 ={u1 ,u2 ,u3 }. Since Ur+1 − Ur−2 = {u4 }, |Ur+1 − Ur−2 |
= 1< k, node B has an inference-route problem. In general, given a threshold k, if an
adversary can link any anonymous ID to a particular user with probability greater than
by using the above method, then we say there is an inference-route problem.

1
k
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2.3. PERFORMANCE METRICS
Our proposed trajectory anonymization approach will be evaluated in terms of three
factors: (i) privacy guarantee (discussed in the previous section), (ii) efficiency (CPU time),
and (iii) data utility rate.
The data utility of the anonymized trajectory dataset will be evaluated using the
following two commonly accepted metrics: Precision and Recall. Intuitively, the less
difference between the anonymized dataset and the original dataset, the better quality the
anonymized dataset is. It is clear that some error will be introduced due to the divide
and conquer technique inherent to a distributed approach. To gauge the utility of the final
dataset, we compare the results from our approach to the original dataset. Recall will allow
us to see how much data is lost by splitting the data across multiple nodes that are unable
to share information with one another. Precision will tell us how similar our results match
those of the original data, thereby showing how much error is introduced. The calculations
for these are as follows:

Precision =
Recall =

Pair s_Matching_Tra j
Tra j_Out put_By_MapReduce

Pair s_Matching_Tra j
Pair s_Matching_Tra j+Missing_Tra j

In the above equations, precision is calculated by comparing the anonymized trajectories obtained from our distributed approach using MELT to the original dataset. Specifically, for each trajectory obtained by our algorithm, we look for the most similar trajectory
from the original data set, i.e., the trajectory with the largest number of common nodes and
compare the support from each approach. If the identified pair of trajectories are identical,
it means we were able to find the same cluster and that trajectories were grouped together
correctly and error was not introduced. Then, the pair are removed from the data sets when
searching for the next pair of identical trajectories. In the equation for Recall, MissingT ra j
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refers to the number of trajectories that the centralized approach (20) found that our algorithm did not. This is due to similar trajectories not being partitioned to the same region
of the map or similar trajectories becoming dissimilar if broken up across multiple regions,
and so they were removed for not meeting our k threshold. The higher the precision and
recall, the better the accuracy of our approach and the less error has been introduced.

3. THE PROPOSED MELT
In this section, we first present an overview of our proposed MELT algorithm, and
then elaborate the detailed steps.

3.1. AN OVERVIEW OF MELT
Figure 3 illustrates the overall data flow in the MELT system. The proposed MELT
system consists of two major phases: (i) map partitioning; and (ii) divide-and-conquerbased trajectory anonymization. The second phase is further divided into three rounds
of processes to ensure the maximum parallelism of the anonymization steps, which are
Trajectory Assignment, Pre-Classification, and Melt.
• Map partitioning: At the beginning, we divide the road map into multiple regions
with the goal of keeping as many similar trajectories as possible in the same region.
A desirable partitioning (as shown in Figure 3) will prevent long frequent traffic flows
from being separated or wrongly pruned, and retain as much of the original data as
possible to maximize the data utility after the anonymization. However, the map
partitioning is an extremely challenging task because it is done before seeing all the
actual data.
• map-reduce-based trajectory anonymization: We design three rounds of map-reduce
processes to fully parallelize the trajectory anonymization process. The Trajectory
Assignment round takes the map partitioning results as input, assigns original trajecto-

24

Figure 3. An overall representation of the architecture of our approach.

ries to the corresponding regions, and calculates the supports of the same trajectories
in each region. The Pre-Classification round removes the roads that could cause
the inference route problem, and then organizes the remaining trajectories into a tree
structure based on their similarity. Finally, the Melt round conducts the fine-grained
anonymization on the sub-trees obtained from the previous round.
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3.2. ROAD MAP PARTITIONING
The first step in our approach is to partition the map into regions that meet the
following conditions: (i) each region contains an approximately equal number of trajectories,
so that the workload can be balanced for the worker nodes during the parallel anonymization
phase; (ii) each region contains trajectories that are as similar as possible to one another so
that the anonymization results will preserve high data utility rate as previously discussed.
However, achieving these two goals is very challenging since we do not want to scan
the entire location dataset to determine the regions, which would otherwise be too time
consuming. Therefore, we propose an adaptive map partitioning algorithm (shown in
Algorithm 1) that partitions the map based on the concept of the traffic flow. Though we
could also parallel this step in our approach, we note that even for the largest city map, we
are able to partition it in an order of milliseconds. Thus, we chose not to complicate this
step by making it parallel.
In order to obtain map partitions adapted to different traffic flow datasets, the key
idea of our approach is to identify hot spots on the road-networks using a small sample
dataset, and then expand them to reconstruct possible traffic flow that forms the sub-regions.
To determine a good sampling rate, we conducted extensive tests on various datasets and
found that any sample above 30% preserves nearly the same accuracy compared to using
the entire dataset. From the sample dataset, we extract hot spots as follows. Hot spots are
popular road intersections. Observe that trajectories tend to frequently pass by some hot
spots such as commercial centers, major road-highway intersections, and intersections in
between residential areas. Based on this observation we aim to identify hot spots as hubs in
each map partition. Specifically, we compute node frequency (i.e., the sum of trajectories
from the sample data set passing by the node/intersection) and road frequency (Definition
3) from the sample trajectories. We sort all the nodes in a descending order of its frequency.
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Then, we start a depth-first road expansion from the most frequent nodes. It is
worth noting that we can parallel this road expansion process by starting the expansion
simultaneously from the top m frequent nodes which are at certain distance from each
other. Given a starting node (n0 ), the road segments connected to n0 will be considered in
a descending order of their road frequency. At the first expansion, the road (r0 ) with the
highest road frequency will be selected. After that, the road r1 with the most similar road
frequency to r0 will be selected, and then r2 with the most similar road frequency to r1 . In
general, each time we select the subsequent road segment that minimizes ∆ = f (ri )− f (ri−1 ),
where f (ri ) and f (ri−1 ) denote the frequency of the road ri and its previous road ri−1 . In this
way, we project possible traffic flow. There are three stopping criteria for the expansion, of
which only one needs to be met: (i) the length between the hot spot and the current node
is equal to or greater than the average length of the trajectories in the data set; (ii) the road
frequency difference (∆) exceeds the threshold ρ =

max f (ri )
dri −1 ,

where dri is the degree of the

node (the number of the roads connected to this intersection). The threshold computes the
case when an incoming traffic flow is equally distributed among outgoing roads; (iii) the
current area being calculated exceeds

total_map_area
num_regions .

Then, the next round of expansion will

start again from n0 to see if more traffic flow can be identified. If not, we move to the node
with the next highest frequency that is not already included in the previous road expansion,
and continue the same road expansion as we did for n0 . The roads associated with the same
hot spot form a region.
After we visit all the hot spots, there may still be some roads which are not yet
included in any region. These roads are usually sparsely distributed and mixed in the roads
that have already been classified. In this case, we conduct a quick breath-first search starting
from unvisited nodes found in the road map and find the closest region for each unvisited
node. If two regions are of the same distance to the unvisited node, the region with the less
difference in road frequency will be selected. At the end of our map partitioning, every
road will be matched to a region.
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ALGORITHM 1: Road Map Division
Data: List of Hot Spots(sampled), HS; road-network (V, E); number of
reducers, RNO
Result: List of road map divisions, Regions
indexHS ← 0
totalArea ← RNO
startFlag ← true
while startFlag = true do
node ← HS[indexHS ]
if node.areaData is not empty then
define list of nodes NList
define region r
add node to region r
add node to NList at index 0
node.depth ← 1
add r, node.depth to node.areaData with key r.id
while NList is not empty do
firstnode ← NList[0]
remove element of NList at index 0
for each nodeneigh in firstnode.Nbrs do
if nodeneigh .areaData does not have key r.id then
if nodeneigh does not violate the stopping criteria then
nodeneigh ← firstnode.depth+1
add nodeneigh to region r
add r, nodeneigh .depth to nodeneigh .areaData with key
r.id
add nodeneigh to NList at index 0
end
end
end
end
add r to Regions
end
else
totalArea ← totalArea+1
end
if indexHS ≥ HS.size() || indexHS ≥ totalArea then
startFlag ← false
end
end
FindAreaForUnvisitedNodes(V, Regions)
return Regions
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3.3. PARALLEL TRAJECTORY ANONYMIZATION
After the map partitioning, we now proceed to discuss how to conduct trajectory
anonymization in parallel. A straightforward way to convert the centralized anonymization
algorithm to a parallel version is to directly execute the centralized algorithm for the subdataset in each region obtained from the map partitioning. However, this straightforward
approach does not fully parallel many functions in the anonymization process, is still unable
to process the volume of data, and it is much less efficient than our proposed approach as
we will soon observe in the experiments.
In order to parallelize the entire anonymization process as much as possible, we
study the centralized algorithm (20) in details. The original centralized algorithm consists
of the following main phases: (i) compute the road frequency; (ii) remove infrequent roads
from trajectories; (iii) cluster similar trajectories and compute the representative trajectory
for each cluster. Moreover, the centralized algorithm needs to scan the trajectory dataset
twice, one for road frequency computation and the other for trajectory clustering.
After examining the detailed anonymization steps, we propose three-rounds of mapreduce processes, which ensures that the whole dataset is scanned only once. Specifically,
we parallelize the road frequency calculation in the first round of process. Then, we
examine the road frequency in parallel and remove infrequent roads. While examining the
road frequency, we also build an index that group same trajectories together to prepare
for the clustering. Finally, we anonymize the different sub-trees of the trajectory index in
parallel based on the global and individual k requirements.
In what follows, we elaborate the detailed algorithms in the map-reduce programming style which consists of two major functions "map" and "reduce". To put it simple, the
map function of each round is in charge of "divide" while the reduce function is charge of
"conquer". Additionally, we leverage the built in nature of the shuffle-sort phase between
map and reduce to further optimize clustering, shuffling, and sorting to the reducers for the
best time optimization and load balancing.
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3.3.1. Round 1: Trajectory Assignment. In this first round, the map function
takes raw trajectory data as input, whereby trajectories are still represented as coordinates.
The number of reducers corresponds to the number of regions we obtained during the map
partition phase. The map function will first map the trajectories to a region in the road
network map. Specifically, the map function assigns an initial score of 0 to each region on
the map for the current trajectory, and increases the score of the region by 1 when a road
segment in the trajectory is found belonging to that region as seen in Algorithm 2 on in
the beginning. We compare each node in the trajectory to a partitions list and update the
score in the locations list. Recall that each road has already been marked with the region
ID during the map partitioning.
When the entire trajectory has been analyzed, the mapper finds the region with
the highest score for the current trajectory. If the region contains more than α% of the
trajectory, the trajectory is considered to belong to that region. Otherwise, we may split the
trajectory across two regions that contain the majority of the trajectory. While the value of
α% has no affect on run times in our experiments, it does affect the data utility rate. The
greater the value of α the more likely we are to place the trajectory in the correct area with
the most similar trajectories. A small α could lead to the same problems we have when
naively partitioning the map. In the case where one area does not contain more than α% of
the trajectory, we propose two methods: (i) splitting the trajectory as mentioned above; (ii)
consider the entire trajectory as part of the region that contained the greater portion of the
trajectory.
When the correct region has been identified, the mapper then converts the coordinates in a trajectory to a list of road IDs. The conversion to the road IDs makes it
easier for trajectory comparison and frequency computation and reduces the intermediate data size. Finally, the map function outputs two types of key-value pairs. One is
h(Ai, Tr j(R1, ...Rk )), 1i, where Ai is the region of the trajectory Tr j represented by road
IDs (R1, ...Rk ). Also, for each road examined, the map function outputs a key value pair
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h(Ai, R j ), 1i, where Ai is the region ID of the road R j . In each mapper, we further utilize
a combiner to sum up the frequency of each trajectory and each road so as to reduce the
amount of intermediate results to be sorted and shuffled among the follow-up reducers. This
intermediate sum is referred to as support in Algorithm 2.
The reduce function then computes the sum (or frequency) of each trajectory and
each road. Note that each reducer handles one region of the map, thereby keeping similar
trajectories together. The road information is saved into a hash table while the trajectories
are output to an intermediate file. The final output of this round is the result of a key-value
conversion, where trajectory information has been moved from the key section to the value
section so that we obtain trajectories for each map partition: <Ai, (Trji , count)>.
To better understand our approach, we use the following running example throughout
the paper. Suppose that we have the map and trajectory data for a city. For easy illustration,
we partition the map into four regions denoted as A1, A2, A3, and A4 respectively. Let
the anonymization parameter k=3 and the trajectories in our data set be Trj1 , Trj2 ,...,Trjn ,
whereby xi j and yi j denote the x and y coordinates for the jth node in the i th trajectory:
Trj1 = {(x11 ,y11 ), (x12 ,y12 ), ..., (x1i , y1i )}
...
Trjn = {(xn1 ,yn1 ), (xn2 ,yn2 ), ..., (xn j , yn j )}
These trajectories are sent to mappers, and the mappers would map each trajectory
to a region and convert the coordinates to road ID’s. Assuming that these trajectories are
mapped to region A1, the output from this first round of map-reduce contains two types of
key-value pairs, the trajectories and their assigned areas as well as each road segment and
their assigned area, as follows:
<(A1, (r1, r2, r3, ...)), 1>,
<(A1, (r1, r2, r3, ...)), 2>,
<(A1, (r3, r5, r2, ...)), 4>,
...
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ALGORITHM 2: First Round of Map Reduce
Data: Tra jFile = trajectory file, Part List = Map Partitions List, RoadMap =
map of coordinates to road ids
Result: List of trajectories[Key = partition, trajectory: Value = support]
List of Roads[Key = partition, road: Value = support]
for each tra j in Tra jFile do
locationsList for each node in tra j do
Part List.find(node) locationsList ← node location
end
largest Location ← NULL
for each location in locationList do
if node count in location > node count in largest Location then
largest Location = location
end
end
partition ← largest Location MapperOut ← [(partition, tra j), 1] for
each Road in newTra j do
MapperOut ← [(partition, Road), 1]
end
Reducer Input: MapperOut([partition, Tra jOr Road), cnt List] while
MapperOut not empty do
count ← 0
for each cnt in cnt List do
count ← count + cnt
end
ReducerOut ← [partition, (Tra jOr Road, count)]
end
end

<(A1, r1 ), 1> ((A1, r1 ), 2>...
<(A1, r2 ), 1> ((A1, r2 ), 2> ((A1, r2 ), 4>...
The reducer computes the overall frequency of trajectories and roads and output the
following:
<(A1, r1 ), 4> <(A1, r2 ), 4> <(A1, r3 ), 4> <(A1, r4 ), 3>...
<A1, ((r1, r2, r3, ...)), 3) >,
<A1, ((r3, r5, r2, ...)), 4) >,
...
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3.3.2. Round 2: Pre-Classification. In this round, the mappers will first process
all the key-value pairs containing road frequency. We leverage the sorting in the shuffle-sort
phase to ensure road frequency information arrives before trajectory frequency. For each
road, the mapper checks its frequency. If the frequency is lower than the anonymization
threshold k, the mapper records this infrequent road ID in a hash table. In algorithm 3,
this is shown as a RoadList. As trajectories arrive at the reducers, the infrequent roads are
removed from the trajectories, thus removing a source of the inference route problem. If
the infrequent road is at one of the ends of the trajectory, it is simply removed. However, if
it is in the middle, the trajectory is split into two if both segments contain at least two road
segments. This helps us maintain the road network constraints and maintain natural road
trajectories.
Although it is now possible to execute the centralized anonymization algorithm
directly on the above dataset in the reducers, we propose another round of map-reduce to
further parallelize the anonymization process. Specifically, the centralized anonymization
algorithm requires to construct a C-Tree (20) to group trajectories based on similarity
before final anonymization. The original C-Tree construction algorithm considers all the
trajectories in a sequential manner within that reducer. However, with all the reducers
operating in parallel, this means all the data would be held in memory at once with several
C-Trees being constructed. Instead, we propose a parallel algorithm to build the C-Tree in
a distributed fashion which also enables the subsequent anonymization to be executed in
sub-trees in parallel. Put simply, we take advantage of map reduce’s batch processing by
processing branches of the C-Tree in parallel, rather than the entire dataset at once.
To construct the C-Tree in parallel, the reducers create a list of slots whereby each
slot corresponds to a branch of the original large C-Tree. In Algorithm 3, these slots are
called Branches. The number of branches chosen depends on the number of available
reducers and the size of the data, meaning that in the final round we will utilize more
reducers and leverage map-reduce’s batch processing at the reduce phase to process all
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ALGORITHM 3: Second Round of Map Reduce
Data: RoadList = Key, Value Pairs[Partition, (Road, Support)
Tra j List = Key, Value Pairs[Partition, (Traj, Support)]
Result: [part.id, (newTraj, Support)]
in f requent Roads ← NULL
for each Road in RoadList do
if support < k then
in f requent Roads.add(Road)
end
end
Branches ← NULL
for each Tra j in Tra j List do
for each roadid in Tra j do
if roadid in in f requent Roads then
newTra js ← Tra j - road
end
end
for each branch in Branches do
if (newTra js, branch).error < γ then
branch.add(newTra js)
end
else
closestBranch.add(branch)
end
end
if branch ← unassigned then
if Branches not full then
Branches.add(newBranch(newTra js))
end
else
closestBranch.add(newTra js)
end
end
end

branches of each C-Tree faster. Similar to the map partitioning in the beginning, we want
to make sure trajectories most similar to one another are placed into the same branch just as
they would in the original C-Tree. We also observe that the density of the data plays a role
in the partitioning as well. Dense data, that is trajectories all close together, can be broken
into more branches than sparse data. An example of branching is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. In the second reducer phase, instead of using one large c-Tree, we break off
similar branches into smaller chunks to benefit from map-reduce’s batch processing in the
reducers.

For each trajectory, if a branch exists such that the trajectory is at least γ similar
to that branch, the trajectory is assigned to the same branch. γ is a system parameter
that controls how similar the trajectories in each branch are to one another. A γ value of
100% means the trajectories are identical. Otherwise, if there are unassigned branches,
the trajectory is assigned to a new branch. Finally, if there is no more room for more
branches and the trajectory is not very similar to the given branches, it is assigned to the
most similar branch. This means that the most similar trajectories will be assigned to the
same branch, minimizing errors as defined in Section 2.3. The output is represented as
hpart.id, (Tra ji, support)i where part.id is the partitioning id consisting of the original
region of the map concatenated with the branch index the trajectory was assigned to and
support containing the number of identical trajectories currently sharing the same roads.
The design of the key ensures that each area is broken up into multiple branches and
processed in chunks in the final stage, rather than all at the same time, while still making
sure to keep the most similar trajectories in the same chunk.
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Referring to our running example, using the road frequencies in the hash table for
the correct area, we remove all infrequent roads from the trajectories and output the new
trajectories with only the frequent roads. As a result, our trajectories have been converted
to the following:
Trj1 = r1 , r2 , r3
Trj2 = r1 , r2 , r3
Trj3 = r1 , r2 , r3
Trj4 = r1 , r2 , r3 , r4
Trj5 = r6 , r7
Trj6 = r6 , r7
Trj7 = r2 , r3 , r6 , r7
If we remember that we set k = 3, then in Tr j4 , r4 would be removed for being
infrequent. The trajectories are sent to the second reducers where trajectories 1, 2, 3, and 4
are partitioned to a branch, and the remaining would be grouped in another branch based
on their similarity.
3.3.3. Round 3: Melt. This final round of our algorithm conducts trajectory
anonymization in parallel. The algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 4. The mappers here
are just identity mappers which directly pass the datasets obtained from the previous step
to the reducers without additional process. Each reducer will receive the dataset that corresponds to a single branch of the C-Tree, and construct the C-Tree as defined in (20). nlike
a two round algorithm where an entire area would be anonymized at once in each reducer,
processing branches instead of entire areas significantly increases efficiency by taking advantage of map-reduce’s’s batch processing and load balancing. More specifically, for each
trajectory, if the total support is greater than k, it forms a cluster and is added to the tree. If
the trajectory has a support lower than k, it will traverse the tree and find the most similar
cluster and attempt to merge with that cluster. Note that this is significantly more efficient
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than the centralized approaches which need to compare trajectories in the entire dataset,
not a small subset such as in our approach. When merging, a representative trajectory is
calculated for the cluster and error is calculated.
When we attempt to merge trajectories with low frequency into a cluster, we calculate
the representative trajectory of the cluster as though the trajectories were added and if the
error is increased by less than β%, the trajectories are added. The error threshold is an
adjustable system parameter which can also be set by the user depending on the amount
of error that is acceptable to them. If no clusters are suitable for merging, a new cluster is
created for the trajectory and added to the tree. By doing this, we are able to possibly merge
multiple trajectories with low support together in order to meet the k threshold, should
they be suitably similar. When all possible merges are done, representative trajectories of
any clusters with at least k support will be output. Any trajectories remaining with less
than

k
2

support will be removed from the data set. Any remaining trajectories with more

than

k
2

support, but less than k will have false trajectories added, increasing the support

to k. This is done to increase data utility while keeping error low and preserving privacy.
The final anonymization output contains road IDs and road frequency in the representative
trajectories of all the clusters. Our anonymization result guarantees strict k-anonymity.
Finishing up our running example, in the last round of reducers, trajectories 1, 2, and
3 would be put into a cluster since their frequency is greater than k and the representative
trajectory would be calculated. Tr j4 would also be merged into this cluster since after
the infrequent road was removed and no additional error is added, it now matches this
cluster. In another reducer, we cluster trajectories 5 and 6; however, if we try to merge
Tr j7 with trajectories 5 and 6, the error is too great and is placed in its own cluster. Since
the frequency for Tr j7 is less than 2k , it is removed entirely. The frequency for the cluster
containing trajectories 5 and 6 however, is greater than 2k . So we simply add a dummy
trajectory to it to bring the frequency up to k. The final output of the anonymized set would
be:
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ALGORITHM 4: Third Round of Map-Reduce
Data: Key = areaID, Branches index
V alue = RIDtraj , sum of traj
Result: Anonymized Trajectory List
ClusList ← list of clusters
for each traj, sum pair do
new CLUSTER ← traj, sum pair
CLUSTERi .repTraj ← traj
CLUSTERi .error ← 0
end
for each CLUSTERj with fewer than k trajectories do
Calculate distance between CLUSTERj and each other cluster
Calculate representative trajectory, REP of adding CLUSTER to closest
cluster, CLUSTER’
Calculate error of adding CLUSTERj to CLUSTER’, NEWERROR
if ERROR change ≤ 5% then
add CLUSTERj to CLUSTER’
CLUSTER’.repTraj ← REP
CLUSTER’ ← NEWERROR
end
end
for each remaining CLUSTER with fewer than k trajectories do
if number of trajectories in CLUSTER ≥ 2k then
while number of trajectories in cluster ≤ k do
add CLUSTER.repTraj to CLUSTER
end
end
end
for each CLUSTER do
if number of trajectories in CLUSTER ≥ k then
for each traj in CLUSTER do
return (" ", CLUSTER.repTraj)
end
end
end

r1 , r2 , r3

r1 , r2 , r3

r6 , r7

r1 , r2 , r3

r1 , r2 , r3

r6 , r7

r6 , r7

The trajectories are now k-anonymized. The data still maintains utility and individual users cannot be identified.

38
3.4. PRIVACY PRESERVATION WITH WITH VARYING k
So far in this work, the privacy of users depends on a globally fixed k value chosen
before trajectories are anonymized. However, for some users, their privacy requirements
may vary compared to other users. This can be observed in many social media environments.
One user may share everything to the public, while others choose not to use social media at
all due to privacy concerns. While these two examples represent both extremes, there are
users all across the spectrum between them. Therefore, we propose to extend our approach
to accommodate users with different privacy requirements and allow each individual user
to set his/her own value of k. As of now, this is the first work to allow user control for their
privacy while maintaining the high efficiency and accuracy of the final results.
ALGORITHM 5: Clusters with varying k
Data: Tr j List = List of trajectories in cluster with individual k
RepTr j = Representative Trajectory of Cluster
Support = Overall Support of Cluster
k = Global Minimum Support Threshold
Result: Anonymized Trajectory List
for each Tr ji in Tr j List do
ki ← User Required Support for Tr ji
if ki > Support then
if (ki − Support) < 0.05Support then
Increase Support to ki
end
else
Remove trajectory from cluster
Support ← Support − β
Recalculate representative trajectory
end
end
if Support < 2k then
break
end
end
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In order to achieve variable k during the anonymization, we propose the following
modifications to our parallel algorithm which are also represented in Algorithm 5. The
first change is to maintain the personal k value for each trajectory throughout all the three
rounds of parallel processes. Note that although it seems that keeping the personal k value
attached to the user may be more space efficient, it is impossible to distinguish users since
no identifiers or even quasi-identifiers are stored in the system. Therefore this information
is attached to the trajectory itself as a local constraint. Specifically, it is carried throughout
the map reduce process as part of the value attached to the support for the trajectory.
The second change occurs in the third round of anonymization, particularly during
the output of representative trajectories. When deciding whether or not to output a cluster,
we will check to make sure each individual k requirement is met. The naive solution is
to compare each personal k with its cluster support. If the cluster support is lower than
one of the users’ k, meaning that the user’s privacy is not met, the cluster will be removed.
However, this naive solution can result in removing a large number of clusters simply due to
some users who have a higher k value than their other cluster members. To reduce loss on
the data utility rate, we propose Algorithm 5 that attempts two options. Instead of directly
removing the whole cluster when its support is lower than some users’ k values, our first
option is to try to increase the cluster support and recalculate the error. If the introduced
error is within the desired threshold, the cluster will be preserved. If the first option does
not work, that is, it produces too much error, we try the second option which is to remove
the trajectory with particularly high k from the cluster and recalculate the representative
trajectory for that cluster. This additional step provides users with more controls on their
privacy while introducing very little time overhead to the performance as later shown in
Section 5.

40
4. SYSTEM ANALYSIS

4.1. PRIVACY AND UTILITY ANALYSIS
Regardless of how private we can make information, we recognize that it makes
little difference if there isn’t any utility in the final result. All related work on trajectory
anonymization as well as other works on privacy subscribe to the common belief that privacy
and utility are inversely related and impossible to reconcile together. In a recent paper (52),
Li and Li discuss the trade-offs and measurements of both privacy and utility and show that
this is not necessarily the case. In our work, we look at the three main observations from
their work and compare our approach to show that we maintain both high privacy and high
utility.
The first observation is that knowledge gained on a small population or individual
has the largest impact on privacy, while knowledge gained overall on a population increases
utility. This makes sense since utility is the information we gain from the data. While
individual data helps in some specific cases, information on an entire population is veritably
useful. However, general knowledge tells us little about a single individual. This means
that privacy must be considered on an individual basis rather than on an entire population
as a whole, while information gained on an individual has little utility compared to an entire
population. If any individual can be identified, then we must assume any individual can be
identified. In our work, we consider each individual’s privacy to be unique and important,
therefore, our work has a large impact on user privacy. In Figure 5 we see that at a k value of
0.25% of the data, we can find the original trajectory of 52% of the trajectories with at least
65% confidence. However, that number drops significantly and at 0.5% of the data as k, we
can no longer accurately identify any individual trajectory from the anonymized dataset.
For this reason, we have chosen 0.5% as our k threshold for our experiments. Similarly, we
are looking for large groups of trajectories in order to study and gain knowledge on patterns
while removing information on individuals and small groups; therefore we also have a large
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utility gain. In Figure 9, we see that a k threshold up to 1% of the data keeps a high utility,
however, after this, the utility drops. This shows we are able to maintain the privacy of
every single individual while also looking at the optimal utility.

Figure 5. At a k value of 0.5% we are no longer able to identify the original trajectories
with at least 65% confidence.
The second observation states that privacy should be measured at its worst case
scenario for reasons stated above, while utility should be measured at its best case. This
means that the unacceptable privacy loss of even a single individual should be considered
the privacy loss for the entire population in the data while utility should be looked at as how
much information is ultimately gained. In our research, we observe that no individual’s
data is published if it is below our k threshold, therefore it is appropriate to measure privacy
loss in terms of k since we do not have any quasi-identifiers in our data. Additionally, since
we allow users to choose their own level of privacy and we consider it a strict constraint,
we can say that we focus strongly on individual privacy. Similarly, we always look at the
highest and average precision and recall in order to determine data utility. This means we
look at the best and average utility of the final data sets and therefore measure at its best
case. As mentioned above, we are able to maintain the privacy at it’s worst case while also
maintaining optimal utility gain.
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Figure 6. Comparison of K vs Utility showing they are measured differently, and therefore
cannot be immediately assumed to be inversely proportional.

Most often, privacy and utility are compared to one another and are considered
to be inversely dependent. However, the last observation from (52) is that privacy is to
be measured against another anonymized dataset to determine if privacy is maintained,
improved, or lost while utility should be measured against the original dataset to determine
how much of the original data is maintained. More specifically, privacy and utility are
measured differently and against different datasets and should not be compared to one
another as though they are dependent. In Figure 6, we see that as k increases, the utility
remains the same for reasonable k. Paired with Figure 5, we see we are able to maintain
strict privacy requirements while maintaining high utility. The two are clearly not inversely
related as previous assumptions would suggest. We can understand this by remembering
that we do not use any quasi-identifiers in our data that would create a link between the two.
In our tests, we compare privacy to the anonymized data produced by the centralized
approach in (20). This is to make sure that through our divide and conquer technique, we
are maintaining the same privacy standards and not unintentionally relaxing our privacy
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requirement. We measure our utility by calculating the number of trajectories retained from
the original data set and how similar those trajectories are to determine how much utility
the anonymized dataset has.
In our work, we calculate utility loss by calculating the precision and recall of the
results from our approach compared to the centralized approach and the original data set to
determine: (i) How much of the original dataset we retained and (ii) How similar are our
results compared to the centralized and original data. This allows us to see what percentage
of the data we kept after anonymization and how much error we introduced in our approach.
Privacy loss, however, is more challenging to calculate. While we can give an
arbitrary k value that sounds secure enough, we choose to use the measurement included
in (52) Ploss =

max
t Ploss(t)

This calculation matches with the second observation, that

privacy should be measured at its worst case and considered for the entire population. We
do not use any quasi-identifiers in our work, so we do not calculate privacy loss for each
individual attribute. Instead, we look at privacy on each hop in a trajectory for a user and
calculate it as:
Ploss =

Íh

i=1 (P(ni )

Í
∗ 2P( mj=1 (ti ))

P(ni ) is the probability that an adversary can identify an individual user from
Í
published users on a road segment. 2P( mj=1 (ti ) addresses the inference route problem
in that it is the probability that both a user chose to take an infrequent road and that
the adversary was able to correctly choose the same road in identifying the user. Since
infrequent roads are not published, this is considered very random for both the user and
the adversary. There are possibly several infrequent roads a user can take, therefore it is a
summation of all those possible paths. We can make it a little more simple by remembering
that the minimum number of people on a published road segment is k and the worst case
being that no unknown, infrequent paths were taken. Therefore we can say that for i hops
in a published trajectory, privacy loss can be calculated as:
Ploss =

Íh

i=1 (P(k))
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Since we use no quasi-identifiers in our data and we remove infrequent roads to protect
against the inference route problem, we can say that k is a sufficient measure of privacy loss
since we maintain all of the observations listed above and in (52).

4.2. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will look at each round of our algorithm and determine the worst
and average case scenario. Map partitioning is not analyzed, as performing this task requires
only the list of road intersections and a small sample set of the data. The size of this data
is trivial compared to the trajectory dataset. As mentioned earlier, we only scan the entire
dataset once. Therefore the processing time is mainly dominated by the second round of
map-reduce of our algorithm. A more detailed explanation of this analysis can be found in
Appendix B.
4.2.1. Round 1 Analysis. In the first round, we examine the time taken to assign
trajectories to map partitions and output each trajectory and the roads in those trajectories
as well as their assigned partitions. Based on this, the time for round 1 is:

cn+n
x

where c

is a constant representing the average number of nodes in a trajectory, n is the number of
trajectories and x is the number of map partitions.
4.2.2. Round 2 Analysis. The data to reach the second round will be the roads and
their assigned map partitions. The first portion of round 2 is to identify infrequent roads.
The processing time for this can be represented as

m
i

where m is the number of roads and

i is the number of mappers. According to the number of occurrences of roads, we remove
the infrequent roads from the trajectories, which takes the time

cn
i .

Once infrequent roads are removed, we perform the pre-clustering algorithm. We
represent the number of chunks we are breaking the data into as j and the value we define for
k-Anonymity as k. In the worst case scenario, there will be only one reducer and each kind
of the trajectory has no more than k similar trajectories. This will result in the maximum
number of chunks of data. The amount of calculation can be represented as

n∗ nk
j .

j is an
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arbitrary value set by the user and is calculated based on data size, therefore we can say
the worst case scenario is

n2
k.

The chance that every trajectory will need to be compared to

every other trajectory is unrealistically small. Such a data set would have no use, as that
would mean no two trajectories are even similar to one another. This implies a very tiny data
set, in which this algorithm would not be used anyway, or a very unrealistic dataset where
no data will be published at all in the end and the rest of the algorithm would terminate,
resulting in faster, but useless processing. Therefore, the realistic worst case scenario is
when the data is clustered evenly into k clusters, which would make the run time nk . Finally,
we consider the I/O cost as nk .
4.2.3. Round 3 Analysis. In round three, each of the data chunks is put into CTrees, and the representative trajectory of clusters meeting our k requirement are the output.
For each trajectory, the algorithm finds the correct cluster in the C-Tree. The time to find
these clusters is nlog(cn), which is split over x reducers. However, in the previous round,
we split the data going to the reducers into j chunks, therefore the time is
each of these clusters, we calculate a representative trajectory:

cn
x ,

nlog(cn)
jx .

For

and finally output the

representative trajectories of the clusters that meet the k requirement: nk .
4.2.4. Overall Complexity. Combining the three rounds of map-reduce, removing
constants, and considering the altered worst case in round two, we are left with a run time
of O(n + nlog(n)), which is significantly faster than current published methods. This run
time assumes the worst case of the data being split into as many clusters as possible, none
of which will be removed and everything published in the end. This is unlikely considering
many side roads that are infrequently traveled, local residential areas, and suburban country
roads. We can assume then, that that the run time will be realistically faster in practice.
4.2.5. Comparison to Other Approaches. In the most recent related work (45),
the authors are able to find the trajectories meeting k by finding the top most frequent
trajectories. This means they need to scan through the dataset at least once to count the
number of times each trajectory exists. They also perform joins to fins similar trajectories
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which, in parallel is fairly fast using their approach. However, while merging has a constant
cost, per trajectory searches for similar trajectories is costly, even in parallel. For large
datasets like those tested in this work, the time would increase dramatically. Assuming
worst case, the cost would be n ∗ n/r where r is the number of instances running in parallel
and n is the number of trajectories in the data. Partitioning is done uniformly and not
based on the map and location, therefore we have to assume that similar trajectories are not
necessarily kept together. This means a greater utility loss or longer processing. Since all
trajectories are compared, we can assume the longer processing time. This leaves at least
a processing time of O(n2 ). For their work, no anonymization is done, only clustering of
similar trajectories. Therefore, the anonymization step must be added to the time.
In our experimental algorithms, we compare to the centralized approach which
requires scanning the entire dataset at least twice, while MELT only scans once. In addition,
there is no distribution of the data or tasks in the centralized approach, so each piece of data
is handled one at a time. Though the number of reducers operating through most of MELT
is dynamic and changes based on data size, we know that for the first round the number of
reducers is based on the number of map partitions. For a real map and data size, we find that
eight partitions is ideal. This means that the centralized approach is eight times slower than
MELT during the process of assigning trajectories to map partitions, and even slower for
later portions of the algorithm. We see this again in Table 4 where the centralized approach
is exponentially slower and even fails.

5. PERFORMANCE STUDY
In this section, we first present the experimental settings and then report the experimental results.
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5.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
All the tests were conducted on a cluster of four physical machines, each being Dell
PowerEdge R730, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2650 v3 processors at 2.30GHz, 2 socket, 14 cores
per socket. The machines are managed using VMWare and divided up into eight virtual
machines, each running CentOS 64bit and having 14 CPU’s and 60GB RAM. We used
Apache Hadoop 2.3.0 and Spark 2.3.0.
Our experiments were conducted on both real and synthetic datasets. The real
datasets (60) contain taxi data from drivers in New York City over a period of three years,
all taken from the same three hour time frame to consider the potential privacy issues
stemming from temporal information. The real datasets are represented in Table 2 and
contain the data file sizes as well as the number of trajectories. Note that one smaller
dataset was taken in order for the centralized and single round approaches to be able to
process it and compare accuracy. In addition to the real datasets, we also generate several
large synthetic datasets over real road maps so that we can show our approach is consistent
over several sets of data and locations. The synthetic datasets contain trajectories with
similar average length in the real datasets, which is about 15 to 20 nodes. The trajectory
node distribution is random to avoid any bias. The synthetic dataset size goes up to 100GB,
which is sufficient to represent commuter traffic in a large city such as Los Angeles or New
York City over a three month period (9). Throughout our experiments, we refer to our
datasets by the number of trajectories in the input data file. Table 1 presents the statistic
summary of the synthetic datasets while Table 2 presents the real datasets.
Table 1. The number of trajectories and the corresponding file size
Number of Trajectories
Dataset Size

5K
3M

50k
14M

500k
141M

2M
540M

5M
1.4G

50M
14G

250M
55G

500M
103G

In our experiments, we compare the performance of the following algorithms in
terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
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Table 2. Real trajectory datasets tested for efficiency
Dataset Name
Number of Trajectories
Data Size

RS
17K
137K

RS50
175M
50GB

RS100
420M
100GB

RS200
862M
200GB

• Centralized: The centralized anonymization approach proposed in (20).
• Single-round MapReduce: This approach executes the original centralized anonymization algorithm directly on each sub-dataset after the map partitioning.
• Stripe: The map is partitioned into even sized stripes and then trajectories are
anonymized using MELT-Hadoop.
• Grid: The map is partitioned into even sized squares and then trajectories are
anonymized using MELT-Hadoop.
• MBR: The roads in the map are partitioned using minimum bounding rectangles
(MBR) such as those in the R-trees. Specifically, we divide the roads into equal-sized
groups based on their distance and enclose them in minimum bounding rectangles to
form partitions. Anonymization is then performed using MELT-Hadoop.
• MELT-Hadoop: The full version of our proposed MELT algorithm in Hadoop.
• MELT-Spark: The full version of our proposed MELT algorithm in Spark.
For the map partitioning, we compare our solution with the naive partitioning
methods, as described in Section 2. To evaluate the anonymization accuracy, we compare
our results with the centralized approach proposed by (20), as well as a single round
map-reduce algorithm and naive partitioning methods. We test the effects of changing
the k-threshold, the number of map partitions, dataset size, and multiple map topologies.
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Finally, we test the effects of having user defined k on the data utility and processing time.
Effectiveness is evaluated based on the precision and recall defined in Section 2. Efficiency
is evaluated using CPU time.

5.2. EFFECT OF MAP PARTITIONING ON ANONYMIZATION ACCURACY
In the first round of experiments, we aim to study how map partitioning will affect
the anonymization accuracy. We compare our dynamic partitioning approach to the naive
partitioning methods introduced in Section 2 and the approach using the simple minimum
bounding rectangles (MBRs). More specifically, our approach has two versions: MELTwhole, MELT-split. In the MELT-whole approach, we always keep the trajectories as a
whole even if it crosses partitions, and assign the trajectory to the partition in which the
majority of the trajectory lies. The MELT-split approach, instead, splits the trajectory if it
crosses partitions, and assign each part of the trajectory to its respective partition. Figure
7 shows the anonymization accuracy of all the approaches in terms of precision and recall.
Recall that both precision and recall need to be calculated against the original anonymization
results produced by the centralized approach. Since the centralized approach cannot handle
very large datasets, in this experiment, we adopt the largest dataset that the centralized
approach can handle which contains 500K trajectories and set the anonymization parameter
k to 0.5% of the number of trajectories.
As show in the figure, both versions of our proposed MELT yield significantly
higher accuracy results compared to other approaches especially when the number of
partitions is large. This conforms with our analysis that equally partitioned maps do not
match the trajectory distributions as well as our proposed dynamic partitioning. Also,
since our approach performs even better for the larger number of partitions, it indicates the
advantages of our approach in large-scale datasets which typically needs more partitions
to handle. We also observe that the MELT-whole achieves slightly better accuracy than
MELT-split since MELT-whole would be able to keep more trajectories intact. In addition,
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(a) Precision

(b) Recall

Figure 7. Anonymization accuracy when dividing the map into different number of partitions

it is expected that the more partitions, the lower the anonymization accuracy. This is
because when the number of partitions is large, the area of each partition becomes small
and hence more trajectories may cross partitions resulting in more difficulties in identifying
similar trajectories. However, more partitions could help reduce the overall processing time
for large-scale datasets since each partition handles a smaller amount of data. Therefore,
we carefully choose the number of partitions based on the dataset size in the following
experiments to balance the anonymization accuracy and the anonymization time.

5.3. EFFECT OF THE ANONYMIZATION PARAMETER k ON DATA UTILITY
As we already know that the proposed MELT has better anonymization accuracy
than other approaches, we now take a further look only at the anonymization results of the
MELT in terms of data utility. Note that both MELT-Hadoop and MELT-Spark versions
have the same data utility rate since they implement the exactly same algorithms.
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Specifically, we investigate the effect of the anonymization parameter k on data
utility in terms of the number of trajectories retrained in the anonymization result. Since k
may have more impact on smaller datasets, we tested three datasets ranging from as small
as 5K to 500K trajectories. For each dataset, we vary k from 0.1% to 1% of the number of
trajectories.
Table 2 shows the number of trajectories left after the anonymization. As expected,
the smaller dataset with 5K trajectories ends up with just 20% of the original trajectories
after the anonymization when k = 1% of the number of total trajectories (i.e., k=50). The
larger the datasets, the more percentage of trajectories are kept after the anonymization.
This is because in the larger dataset, the chances of finding similar trajectories is higher
and hence more trajectories can be anonymized. In addition, we also observe that there is
a significant reduce in the number of anonymized trajectories when k increases from 0.5%
to 1%, which suggests that the anonymization parameter k should not be set to be too large.
The larger the k value, the lower the probabilities will be to obtain similar trajectories in
the group larger than k.
Table 3. Number of trajectories in the anonymization results
Number of trajectories in the dataset
k=0.1% of data
k=0.5% of data
k=1% of data

5K
50K
500K
4255 35809 285995
3228 30910 279500
878 18626 132602

Next, we are also interested in examining the effect of k on the precision and recall.
As shown in Figure 8, we can see there is little difference in the accuracy across the different
datasets, meaning using 1% of the data in the 5k dataset is about the same accuracy as taking
1% of the data in the larger datasets. This means that regardless of the size of data, keeping
the same k percentage of the dataset will yield the same accuracy results. k does not need
to change based on the data size.
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(a) Precision

(b) Recall

Figure 8. Anonymization accuracy when varying k

It is true, however, that changing the percentage of the data that k represents has
a significant impact on the accuracy. This is an expected outcome due to the fact that the
larger the k value, the more trajectories need to be the same to be published. This means
many more trajectories will be eliminated for not meeting our k threshold and therefore
more data is lost. Based on our experiments, approximately 1% of the data is the optimal
percentage of the data k should represent. As we see in Figure 9, the accuracy drops quickly
after 1%. This same threshold occurred in all of our dataset tests.

Figure 9. The accuracy of the data drops significantly when k represents more than 1% of
the data.
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5.4. SCALABILITY TEST
After obtaining the insights regarding the map partitions and the parameter k, we
now proceed to evaluate the scalability of our proposed MELT which is indeed the major
goal of our design. We first tested the centralized annonymization approach to see its
scalability limit. As shown in Table 4, the centralized approach crashes when the dataset
contains more than 2M trajectories.
Table 4. The anonymization time using the centralized approach
Number of trajectories in the dataset
File size
Processing time (minutes)

5K
50K
3M
14M
0.9752 22.6

500K
2M
141M 540M
1157.72 NA

RS(17K trajectories)
137M
1441.49

Since the centralized approach is impossible to complete the anonymization as
shown in Table 4, we only plot the processing time of the parallel approaches in the
following figures for clear comparison. In the experiments, the number of partitions is set
to 8 and the value of k is set to 0.5% of the number of trajectories. As shown in Figure 10,
the full version of the MELT-Hadoop is similarly fast as the MELT version with simple map
partitioning methods, i.e., stripe and grid. This indicates that our dynamic map partitioning
does not introduce much computational overhead. Moreover, we also observe that the
single-round MapReduce approach does not scale well and crashes when the number of
trajectories reach 5M. This proves the need of having multi-round of divide-and-conquer
as in the full version of the MELT. Also, it is not surprising to see that the Spark version of
MELT is about twice faster than the Hadoop version. The performance gain is attributed to
the in-memory access by Spark.
In addition to the synthetic datasets, we also compare the same approaches using the
real datasets in Table 2. Based on our results in Figure 11, our approach of MELT-Hadoop
and MELT-Spark show much better scalability with the growing data size, with MELTSPARK showing more than 120% improvement in CPU time compared to MELT-Hadoop.
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Figure 10. Effect of data size on anonymization time

Figure 11. CPU time comparison on real datasets.

Further, we also compare the anonymization accuracy of all the parallel approaches.
Since the anonymization accuracy is calculated by comparing the anonymization results
with the centralized approach, Figure 12 shows the comparison results with the dataset up to
500K which is the maximum size that the centralized approach can process. Observe that the
full version of the MELT achieves much better precision and recall than the naive partitioning
approaches when the dataset grows larger. Note that the full version of MELT here refers
to both MELT-Hadoop and MELT-Spark since they produce exactly same anonymization
results. When the dataset is very small (say 5K), the anonymization accuracy is similar
among all the approaches because the number of trajectories in the anonymization results
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is small too and hence less difference. Note that only two partitions are used for 5K dataset
whereby the Grid partitioning approach is basically the Strip partitioning, and thus no result
is reported for the Grid approach for the 5K dataset.

(a) Precision

(b) Recall

Figure 12. Effect of data size on anonymization accuracy
Additionally, for the real dataset tests, we calculated the recall as recall is compared
to the original dataset and not the centralized anonymized dataset like precision is. We
achieved an average of 0.81376 recall, meaning we maintained a high data utility rate in
terms of number of trajectories retained from the original dataset. Precision could not be
measured as the centralized anonymization approach could not process the datasets for us
to compare.

5.5. EFFECT OF MAP TOPOLOGY ON EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY
In this experiment, we evaluate the effect of the map topology on the anonymization efficiency as well as accuracy. In order to measure the accuracy, we generate 500K
trajectories (the maximum size that the centralized approach can handle) on four different
real maps representing big cities. We set the number of the partitions to 6 and k to 0.5% of
the number of trajectories. As we can see in Figures 13, our proposed MELT-Spark is the
fastest approach among all regardless of the map topology used. The single-round MapRe-
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duce approach is the slowest. This is because MELT, Strip, and Grid not only partition
the original input dataset but also break the anonymization task into sub-tasks and hence
achieve better parallelism than the single-round MapReduce.

Figure 13. Effect of map topology on anaonymization time
When comparing the anonymization accuracy, MELT again achieves the highest
accuracy among all. The reason is the same as previously discussed. It is because the equal
partitioning cannot capture the real trajectory distribution. In addition, it is worth noting
that the single-round MapReduce has the similar accuracy as the MELT since they adopt
the same map partitioning approach.

(a) Precision

(b) Recall

Figure 14. Precision and recall for different map topologies
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5.6. EFFECT OF USER DEFINED k ON ANONYMIZATION ACCURACY
Finally, we examine the effect of user defined k on the anonymization accuracy. In
the dataset of 500K trajectories, for each user, we randomly generate its k value ranging
from 0 (no privacy protection needed) to 0.5% of the number of trajectories. Then, we
compare the precision and recall between the anonymization results using the same value of
k (0.5% of the number of trajectories) and the anonymization result that used the variable
k for different users. Table 5 shows that the changes in precision and recall are very little
after introducing customized k. Such good performance is because our algorithm carefully
adjusts the clusters of trajectories based on individual ks and maximizes the number of
trajectories to be kept. The processing time after introducing the customized k is also
almost the same as the version with the same global k, and hence we did not include the
figure here. The processing time is similar because the algorithm for the customized k adds
only small conditions to the original version which do not affect the overall processing time.
Table 5. Change of anonymization accuracy when using individual k parameters
Number of Trajectories
5k
50k
500k

Precision Change
-0.003
-0.003
-0.009

Recall Change
-0.002
0.00005
-0.004

We do note, however, that for other map partitioning methods, allowing user define
k introduces more error and sets MELT apart from those approaches even further. This
is because the size of the clusters are already smaller since similar trajectories are split
across multiple partitions, and therefore removed from the final anonymized dataset. By
introducing a larger k value in some clusters, causes more clusters to be lost entirely, where
as if more similar trajectories were clustered together, the cluster could still be published.
Therefore, MELT is best suited for user control over their privacy. Other recent approaches
mentioned in the Literature Review do not have the ability to allow for user defined privacy
requirements, and therefore cannot be compared.
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6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel parallel algorithm called MELT to efficiently
anonymize large data sets of trajectories. The proposed MELT employs three rounds of
divide-and-conquer strategies that break the centralized anonymization task into sub-tasks
that can be performed in parallel. The MELT also provides flexibility to individual users
to define their own privacy levels. Our anonymization results on both real and synthetic
datasets demonstrate that our approach successfully protects the personal data from direct
knowledge or inference attacks while at the same time achieves high data utility rate.
The extensive experimental study also shows that our method performs much better when
compared with recent works in terms of computation speed, volume of data, and data utility.
To further show the benefits of our work, we have also analyzed the relationship between
the privacy and utility aspects of our approach.The outcome of this research can be used by
cellular and other location service providers to publish anonymized trajectory data much
faster so that it can be used in a wide variety of services in timely fashion without sacrificing
user privacy.
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ABSTRACT
People constantly share their photos with others through various social media sites.
With the aid of the privacy settings provided by social media sites, image owners can
designate scope of sharing, e.g., close friends and acquaintances. However, even if the
owner of a photo carefully sets the privacy setting to exclude a given individual who is not
supposed to see the photo, the photo may still eventually reach a wider audience including
those clearly undesired through unanticipated channels of disclosure, causing a privacy
breach. Moreover, it is often the case that a given image involves multiple stakeholders who
are also depicted in the photo. Due to various personalities, it is even more challenging
to reach agreement on privacy settings for these multi-owner photos. In this work, we
propose a privacy risk reminder system called REMIND, which estimates the probability
that a shared photo may be seen by unwanted people - through the social graph - who are
not included in the original sharing list. We tackle this problem from a novel angle by
digging into the big data regarding image sharing history. Specifically, the social media
providers possess a huge amount of image sharing information (e.g., what photos are shared
with whom) of their users. By analyzing and modeling such rich information, we build
a sophisticated probability model that efficiently aggregates image disclosure probabilities
along different possible image propagation chains and loops. If the computed disclosure
probability indicates high risks of privacy breach, a reminder is issued to the image owner
to help revise the privacy settings (or at least inform the user about this accidental disclosure
risk). The proposed REMIND system also has a nice feature of policy harmonization that
helps resolve privacy differences in multi-owner photos. We have carried out a user study
to validate the rationale of our proposed solutions and also conducted experimental studies
to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed REMIND system.
Keywords: Image privacy, Sharing chain, Risk estimation, Probability model
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1. INTRODUCTION
With social media affecting the way millions of people live their lives each day,
we have assisted to an explosion of user contributed content online, especially images and
media files. Some of the user-contributed photos may be harmless and effective for users’
self-recognition and gratification. However, for many of these photos, the portrayed content
affects individuals’ social circles, as it either explicitly includes multiple users or it relates to
users other than the original poster (e.g., a child or a house/location). To further complicate
this issue, photos may be leaked or disclosed with an audience larger than expected, for
both the image owner and its stakeholders.
Although many social websites provide privacy configurations that allow the users
to specify to whom they would like to share the photos with, through the possible re-sharing
via the friends to friends, it is often the case that the photos reach a wider audience than
that in the original sharing list of the photo owner. Figure 1 illustrates a simple example of
the privacy breach caused by such image sharing propagation.

Figure 1. An Example of Privacy Breach Due to Image Propagation
Alice wanted to share her images with some her friends but not Mary. However,
one of Alice’s friends, Bob, forwarded Alice’s images to his friends whose social circles
include Mary, and eventually Mary views Alice’s images although Mary is not supposed
to. Such privacy risks caused by sharing from friends to friends have been aware by many
(3; 25; 27; 36). Some propose monitoring approaches to check the privacy violation during
each sharing event (3; 27). Most employ (5; 13; 33; 37; 49) clustering techniques to classify
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users based on their privacy preferences, profile similarities, social network topology, image
content and metadata, in order to identify risky users and recommend better privacy policies
. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works leverages the image
sharing history and develops probability models to provide a straightforward view of the
sharing consequence as we will elaborate shortly in this work.
Another critical factor that could cause a privacy breach is the difference among
privacy preferences of people depicted in the same photo. Due to the variety of personalities,
users may drastically disagree on the scope of sharing for a given co-owned image causing
some significant conflicts. In some instances, it can be courtesy that these users may
personally discuss which photos can be posted and by whom so that there are no conflicts
of interest, but that takes time and is not often the route pursued. An increasing number
of recent works (50) have analyzed how to address the policy conflict, by considering
every user’s prior privacy preferences of sharing or through semi-automated resolution
mechanisms. These existing works are usually based on fuzzy logic while we aim to
provide clear evidence of chances of privacy breach.
In this work, unlike any existing works, we tackle the privacy risk estimation problem
from a novel angle by digging into the big data regarding image sharing history. Specifically,
the social media providers possess a huge amount of image sharing information (e.g., what
photos are shared with whom) of their users. In fact, even some external websites (32)
have provided tools to maintain statistics of the sharing propagation throughout the social
networks.
By analyzing and modeling the rich information of image sharing history, we build a
sophisticated probability model that aggregates image disclosure probabilities along different possible image propagation chains and loops. We present the users with direct evidence
of potential scope of sharing, i.e., the probability of unwanted people to access one’s photos.
Specifically, if the computed disclosure probability indicates high risks of privacy breach,
a reminder will be issued to the image owner to help revise the privacy settings. Users then
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have the opportunity to make informed decisions when setting their privacy preferences.
For example, our work would remind Alice that sharing with Bob could result in 90%
chance that Mary would see the photo as well. Based on such a high disclosure probability,
it is very likely that Alice would remove Bob from her initial sharing list, and hence avoid
the potential privacy breach.
Carrying the spirits of our goal, the proposed system is named REMIND (Risk
Estimation Mechanism for Images in Network Distribution). The REMIND system has the
following novel contributions:
• The REMIND system provides users a quantitative and easier way to directly evaluate
the potential consequence of sharing. It "nudges" users about the risk of sharing the
image with certain people and remind the owners of the photos about users that could
be explicitly excluded to avoid over sharing. The goal is to reduce the risk of privacy
breach that could result from the image propagation in the social network.
• Underlying the REMIND system, we propose a sophisticated probability model that
models the image sharing history. It is very challenging to calculate and aggregate the
disclosure probabilities caused by various sharing paths especially loops in convoluted
social networks. To overcome this, we design an efficient probability serialization
algorithm that ensures each node in the related social circle to be visited and calculated
only once.
• The REMIND system also has a nice feature called policy harmonization, which calculates image disclosure matrix to help resolve differences in the privacy preferences
of people depicted in the same photo.
• We have carried out a user study to validate the rationale of our proposed solutions
and also conducted experimental studies in real-life social networks to evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed REMIND system.
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In addition, it is worth noting that while we present our models with images as a reference
content type, any co-owned or co-managed piece of content in an online social setting could
take advantage of REMIND, with no significant differences.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
problem statement. Section 3 elaborates the proposed REMIND system. Section 4 reports
the experimental study and Section 5 concludes this work.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the image sharing problem in a finite social network as defined below.
Definition 1 (Social Network) A social network is defined as an undirected graph G(Ξ, R),
where Ξ is the set of the users in this social network, and R is the set edges connecting pairs
of users who have relationship with each other, i.e., R = {(ui, u j )} where ui , u j ∈ Ξ.
Each user can specify a group of people in the same social network who are allowed
to access the shared image. The privacy policy is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Image Privacy Policy)An image privacy policy is in the form of Pol =
{img, u, U + }, where u is the image owner, and U + is the group of people who are allowed
to access user u’s image img.
Our work aims to compute the disclosure probability (as defined in Definition 3)
that the shared image may be seen by people who are in the photo owner’s contact list but
are not included in the photo owner’s original sharing list. The reason to focus on the users
who are in the image owner’s contact list is because this is the explicitly specified group of
people who the image owner clearly knows whether or not to share the image with. In other
words, the image owner has the greatest privacy concerns regarding the group of users if
they are not included in the sharing list. For example, if Alice would like to share photos
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of her extreme sport activities with her college friends but not her parents as she does not
want them to be worried. The photos may eventually reach a wider audience, such as other
college students not specified in Alice’s original sharing list, but Alice may not care about
those strangers as long as her parents do not receive the photos from others.
Definition 3 (Image Disclosure Probability)Let uo denote the owner of an image img,
and Uo denote the set of users in uo ’s contact list. Let Pol = {img, uo, Uo+ } denote the
corresponding privacy policy for image img. The image disclosure probability Puo ⇒ut is
the probability that user uo ’s image may be seen by a target user ut , where ut ∈ U − , and
U − = Uo /U + which is the set of the users who are not in the sharing list.

3. THE REMIND SYSTEM
We propose a REMIND (Risk Estimation Mechanism for Images in Network Distribution) system that presents the image owner a privacy disclosure probability value that
indicates the risk of his/her image being viewed by an unwanted person. The REMIND
system not only works for photos with single owners, but can also be utilized to help resolve
privacy differences in multiple users depicted in the same image. Figure 2 gives an overview
of the data flow in the REMIND system.
First, the REMIND will identify the list of people who the image owner uo does
not want to share image with, i.e., Uo− , by analyzing the policies associated with the image.
Note that for an image with multiple users, e.g., uo1 , uo2 , ..., uon , this step will return a set of
Uo−i whereby the Uo−i is the list of people that user uoi does not want to share the photos with.
The second step is to conduct the risk analysis for each user in Uo− . We will first extract the
sub-network connected to the owner(s) of the photo and then calculate the image disclosure
probability for the image owner(s) with respect to the users (ut ) in Uo− . If the computed
disclosure probability Puo ⇒ut is above certain threshold (e.g., 80%), the REMIND system
will issue an alert to the image owner uo regarding this. The alert will clearly indicate
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Figure 2. An Overview of REMIND System

through which user who are in the original sharing list, user ut may have the chance of
Puo ⇒ut to view the shared image. If the photo has multiple users in it, the REMIND system
will conduct a policy harmonization process which combines all the alerts and suggests a
possibly smaller group of users to share in to avoid undesired image disclosure. In what
follows, we will elaborate the detailed algorithm for each step.

3.1. PROPAGATION CHAIN MODELS
As aforementioned, our goal is to calculate the probability that the photo owner’s
contact who is not in the original sharing list may view the shared photo via friend-to-friend
sharing chains. We model such sharing propagation as an image sharing graph as follows.

71
Definition 4 (Image Sharing Graph) An image sharing graph is a directed graph SG(Ξ,
SR, Ψ), where Ξ is the set of users in the social network, and SR is the set of ordered pairs of
users SR = {hui, u j i} which indicates that user ui shares some images with user u j , Ψ is the
set of detailed image sharing information including the origin of the image and the number
of shares received. Specifically, Ψ = {ψuo :ui →u j } where ψuo :ui →u j denote the number of
images originally owned by uo and are shared by user ui with u j .
Figure 3 illustrates a portion of the image sharing graph in a large social network.
Let us take user uo ’s photo sharing propagation as an example (highlighted red in the figure).
Assume that user uo has 1000 photos of her own. She shares 800 out of 1000 with her
contact u1 , denoted as “uo 800/1000" on the edge from uo to u1 . User uo also shares 500
her own photos with user u4 who forwards 20 of the received photos to u3 and 400 to u1 .
Now user u1 has uo ’s photos from two sources. It is possible that u1 shares 400 photos out
of the 800 shares that she directly received from uo with u2 , and another 200 photos out of
the shares that she received from u4 with u2 too. Correspondingly, we see two pieces of

Figure 3. An Example of Image Sharing Graph
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Figure 4. Single Photo Propagation Chains

sharing information on the arrow from u1 to u2 . Next, u2 further shares 10 of uo ’s photos
from those sent by u1 with u3 . In addition, uo also shares 10 out of 1000 photos directly
with u3 .
Based on the image sharing graph, we proceed to discuss how to compute the image
disclosure probability Puo ⇒ut , i.e., the probability that user uo ’s photo may be viewed by
user ut through the sharing propagation chains. Let us start from the simplest case (Figure
4(a)) when there is only one intermediate user connecting the photo owner uo and the target
user ut . The probability Puo ⇒ut can be computed by Equation 1.
Puo ⇒ut = Puo ⇒ui · Puo (ut |ui )

(1)

In Equation 1, Puo ⇒ui is the probability that uo may share photos with ui which can also
be denoted as P(ui |uo ), and P(ut |ui ) is the probability that ut may receive uo ’s photos from
ui when ui has uo ’s photos. Specifically, let No denote the original number of photos that
user uo possess, let No−i denote the number of photos that user uo shares with ui , and let
Ni−t denotes the number of uo ’s photos that ui further shares with ut . Puo ⇒ui can be easily
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computed by

No−i
No ,

and Puo (ut |ui ) can be computed by
Puo ⇒ut =

Ni−t
No−i .

Then, we have the following:

No−i Ni−t
Ni−t
·
=
No No−i
No

Next, we extend the above case to the scenario when there are multiple users in a
single chain as shown in Figure 4(b). The probability that uo ’s photos may reach the target
user ut via multiple routes of sharing can be computed by Equation 2.
Puo ⇒ut = Puo ⇒ui · Puo (ut |ui+n )

n
Ö

Puo (ui+ j |ui+ j−1 )

(2)

j=1

At the end, we extend the probability formula to the generic scenarios (as shown in
Figure 5) when there are multiple propagation chains between the photo owner uo and the
target user ut . The final probability Puo ⇒ut is given by Equation 3, where Pck denotes the
sharing probability from the chain containing ut ’s direct parent u k , and m denotes the total
number of sharing propagation routes.
Puo ⇒ut = 1 −

m
Ö
(1 − Pck )
k=1

m
Ö
= 1−
(1 − Puo ⇒uk · P(ut |u k ))

(3)

k=1

In Equation 3, the image disclosure probability Puo ⇒ut is computed by aggregating
disclosure probabilities from various sharing routes. Specifically, Pck is the probability that
ut may receive uo ’s photos from the propagation chain ck . On the chain ck , u k is the ut ’s
direct sender, and hence Pck is the product of the probability Puo ⇒uk that u k receives uo ’s
photos and the probability P(ut |u k ) that u k forwards the photos to ut . Correspondingly,
1 − Pck is the probability that ut will not obtain uo ’s photos from the chain ck . Then,
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Figure 5. A Generic Photo Propagation Model

Îm

k=1 (1

− Pck ) is the probability that ut will not receive uo ’s photos from any of the m

propagation chains. Finally, by negating the previous probability, we obtain the probability
that ut may have access to uo ’s photos.

3.2. DISCLOSURE PROBABILITY CALCULATION
In the previous section, we have discussed how to calculate the image disclosure
probability given the possibly multiple sharing routes. The next step is to identify these
sharing routes in the social network. However, the real social network is very complex
which may contain a huge number of paths between two users. The critical question here
is: "Is it possible to compute such image disclosure probability in practise?" The answer is
positive. Even though the paths connecting two users in the social network may be huge,
the number of active sharing chains is not. This is based on an important observation that
people’s interests in sharing others’ photos typically decrease as the relationship with the
photo owner becomes farther away. For example, Alice shares her photo of her first surfing
with her roommate Kathy. Kathy further shares the photo with her friend Mary in the same
college who may also know Alice with the thought that Mary may be surprised to see Alice
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is doing extreme sports. It is likely that Mary may share the photo again with other friends
who may also know Alice. However, the sharing is likely to stop when it reaches a person
who barely knows Alice.
Based on the above observations, we can extract a sub-network that is closely related
to the photo owner before the probability calculation. The sub-network is formally defined
as personal image sharing graph in Definition 5.
Definition 5 (Personal Image Sharing Graph) Given an image sharing graph SG(Ξ, SR,
Ψ), the personal image sharing graph of a user uo is PSG(Ξo , SRo , Ψo ) which satisfies the
following two conditions:
(1) Ξo ⊆ Ξ, Ro ⊆ R, and Ψo ⊆ Ψ;
(2) ∀ u j ∈ Ξo , ∃ψuo :ui →u j .
The first condition in the personal image sharing graph’s definition ensures that PSG
is a sub-graph of the entire image sharing graph. The second condition ensures that only
the users who received photos from uo are included in this PSG. For example, reconsider
the social network shown in Figure 3. We can extract the personal image sharing graph for
uo as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. User uo ’s Personal Image Sharing Graph
Assume that the image owner uo shares a new photo with only u4 . The red dotted
arrows in Figure 6 indicate that u1 and u3 are uo ’s contacts but are not in the sharing list of
this photo. We now proceed to calculate the probability that two other uo ’s contacts, i.e., u1
and u3 , may also view the image.
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Puo ⇒u4 = 1
400
Puo ⇒u1 = Puo ⇒u4 · P(u1 |u4 )) = 1× 500
=0.8

Puo ⇒u2 = Puo ⇒u1 ×

200
400

= 0.8×0.5=0.4

Puo ⇒u3 = 1 − (1 − Puo ⇒u2 · P(u3 |u2 ))·
(1 − Puo ⇒u4 · P(u3 |u4 ))
10
20
= 1 - (1- 0.4× 200
)(1-1× 500
) = 0.048

From the above example, we can see that even though uo did not directly share
the photo with u1 , there is still 80% chance that u1 may view the photo shared from other
channels. On the other hand, there is very little chance (5%) that u3 may see the photo. To
calculate these probabilities, the sequence of the node visit in the personal image sharing
graph is important. The calculation sequence is u1 , u2 and u3 in the example. If we
follow another computation order such as u3 , u1 and u2 , we will obtain only part of the
probability values for u3 , before u2 is calculated. Once u2 ’s probability is known, we
will have to adjust u1 ’s probability value. This is obviously inefficient especially in largescale social networks. Therefore, we need to ensure that the parent nodes’ probabilities
are computed first. However, identifying the calculation order is not trivial due to the
complicated interconnections among nodes in the social network that may create sharing
loops. To efficiently and correctly calculate and aggregate the disclosure probabilities, we
formally model the problem as the probability serialization (Definition 6).
Definition 6 (Probability Serialization) Let PSG(Ξo , SRo , Ψo ) be the personal image sharing graph of a user uo . The probability serialization process aims to identify a serialization
ordering of node visits which minimizes the node visits and ensure that each node’s disclosure probability is calculated correctly. The probability serialization ordering is in the
form of ui ui+1  ... ui+k , where ui ∈ Ξo , hui, ui+1 i ∈ SRo , and ui ui+1 denotes ui ’s
probability will be computed before ui+1 ’s probability.
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Figure 7. Sharing Scenario Case 1

To conduct the probability serialization, we first analyze various sharing scenarios
and classify them into two main categories as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.
For clarity, the figures do not include the detailed sharing amounts while the arrows in the
figures only indicate that there are some photos belonging to uo being forwarded to others.
Case 1 depicts the scenario when the disclosure probability of a user needs to be
calculated after all its parent nodes have been computed. Specifically, as shown in Figure 7,
the photo owner uo shares photos with his friend u1 but not u4 . User u1 then forwards some
of the photos to u2 . User u2 further shares the photos with u3 . Moreover, the three users
u1 , u2 and u3 all forward some of the uo ’s photos to user u4 . In this case, the probability
that uo ’s photos may be seen by u4 depends on the the disclosure probabilities of u1 , u2
and u3 which need to be computed first. The appropriate calculation order of this case is
u1 u2 u3  u4 .
Case 2 depicts the scenario when there is a sharing loop. Specifically, user u2
forwards uo ’s photos to u3 , and u3 forwards the photos to u4 . Without knowing that u2
already has seen uo ’s photos, u4 forwards the photos received from u3 to u2 , thus creating
a sharing loop. In this case, even though u4 is also u2 ’s immediate parent, u2 ’s disclosure
probability does not depend on u4 since u4 is sharing what u2 originally sent out. The
appropriate serialization ordering of this case is u1 u2 u3  u4 .
Based on the above classification, we now proceed to present a generic probability
calculation algorithm. We employ two main data structures to facilitate the probability
serialization. The first structure is a priority queue which stores the uncomputed nodes that
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Figure 8. Sharing Scenario Case 2

have been visited so far. The second structure is a link list that stores the set of uncomputed
parent nodes of each uncomputed node. The probability calculation takes the following
steps (an outline of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6):
1. Initialization: Starting from the photo owner node uo ’s initial sharing list, we look
for the children nodes of the users in the sharing list and add them into the priority
queue.
2. Checkingcurrentnodeinthepriorit yqueue: Then, we examine the node in the priority queue one by one. Let ui denote the node in the priority queue that is under
consideration. For any node in the priority queue, its probability is finalized only
after all its parent nodes’ probabilities are computed. Therefore, we check if all of ui ’s
parents’ probabilities have already been computed. If so, we compute the probability
of ui , remove it from the priority queue and perform the probability propagation
routine. In the case that at least one parent node of ui whose probability is not yet
computed, we will just keep ui in the priority queue. In both cases, we will proceed
to perform the expansion routine for ui .
3. Probabilit ypropagation: Given a node ui whose probability is just computed, we
will set the parent flags of all the nodes that take it as the parent to “computed" and
calculate a partial probability for these nodes by plugging ui ’s probability to Equation
1.
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4. E xpansion: This step is to expand the sharing chain by considering ui ’s children
nodes. If ui has a child node uc which has not been visited yet, uc will be added
to the priority queue and uc ’s parents including ui will be added to the uc ’s parent
list. If some of the uc ’s parents’ probabilities are known, their parent flags are set to
"computed". After the expansion, the algorithm goes back to the second step to check
the next node in the priority queue. In the case that uc has already been stored in the
priority queue, that means a sharing loop between ui and uc is detected. We will then
give ui a special flag which means the loop-breaking routine is pending until there is
no more new node to be added to the priority queue.
5. BreakingtheLoopbetween ui anduc : Up to this point, all of the ui ’s parents should
already be in the priority queue. We will compute uc ’s probability by using any
partial probability that ui has so far. Note that the partial probability that ui possesses
is definitely from sources other than uc , so it is important to factor them into uc ’s
probability calculation. Once uc ’s probability is computed, we will remove it from
the priority queue, perform the probability propagation and then check the next node
in the priority queue (i.e., go back to the second step).
To have a better understanding of the above probability calculation algorithm, let us
step through the following example as shown in Figure 9. This example shows the image
propagation from user uo . In particular, uo shares a new photo with u1 but not two other
friends u4 and u5 . This example combines the two types of sharing scenarios including
multi-parent relationship and multiple sharing loops.
Figure 10 presents how the information is updated in the priority queue and the parent
lists throughout the probability calculation. The first black rows in the tables represent the
priority queue at different steps, while the second rows represent the parent lists.
At the beginning, the child node (u2 ) of the user (u1 ) who is in the photo owner’s
sharing list is added to the priority queue. Since uo shares the photo directly with u1 , the
probability that u1 views the photo is 1. We start evaluating the first node in the priority
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ALGORITHM 6: Probability Calculation Algorithm
Data: Input:
mage sharing graph Result: Output:
Disclosure probabilities of uo ’s friends Extract uo ’s personal image sharing
(PIS) graph
for each user ui in uo ’s sharing list do
Initialize Prob[ui ] ← 1
Add ui to priority_queue
end
while priority_queue is not empty and Uo− is not computed do
ui ← priority_queue.pop()
for each parent u j of ui do
Pi j ← chain probability (Equation 1)
Prob[ui ] ← Prob[ui ]*(1-Pi j )
end
if all of ui ’s parents are computed then
Prob[ui ] ← 1-Prob[ui ]
Remove ui from priority_queue
end
for each ui ’s direct friend uc do
if uc is not in priority_queue then
Add uc to priority_queue
end
else
Break_Loop between ui and uc
end
end
end

Figure 9. An Example of Sharing Graph
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Figure 10. An Example of Probability Serialization

queue, i.e., u2 . Since u2 has another parent u5 whose probability is unknown at this moment,
we hold on the calculation of u2 ’s probability and continue expanding the sharing networks
from u2 . As a result, u2 ’s children nodes u3 and u4 are added to the priority queue too.
Since u3 and u4 also need to wait for their parent nodes to be computed, the expansion
continues whereby u3 ’s children (i.e., u5 and u6 ) and u4 ’s children (i.e., u7 ) are added to the
priority queue. Next, we encounter the node u5 whose child u2 already exists in the priority
queue. That means we detect a sharing loop that involves u2 and u5 . In this case, we give
u5 a special mark indicating that we will revisit u5 at a later time. We continue the network
expansion from u6 to its child u8 .
Up to this point, all nodes whose probabilities can be computed should have been
removed from the priority queue. It is time to deal with the sharing loops. Specifically,
we locate the node u5 which has a special mark due to the sharing loop. Then, we find the
node u2 in the priority queue which has u5 as a parent. Since the loop starts from u2 and
goes to u5 , it is not necessary to include u5 ’s probability during u2 ’s calculation. Therefore,
we go ahead to calculate u2 ’s probability without considering u5 . Once u2 ’s probability
is obtained, it "unlocks" its children nodes u3 and u4 whose probabilities are ready for
calculation too. Next, we can calculate the probabilities of u3 and u4 ’s children nodes which
are u6 and u7 . Finally, we can compute u5 . Note that the calculation stops here without
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calculating u8 because all of uo ’s contacts in the non-sharing list have been computed. The
complete probability calculation ordering is u2 u3 u4 u6 u7 u5 (indicated by the
circled number on top of each node in the figure).
The above probability calculation algorithm provides the calculation ordering for
all the users that are in the photo owner uo ’s personal image sharing graph. It is worth
noting that the efficiency of probability calculation can be further improved by stopping the
calculation for a node if its current probability is already higher than the decision threshold.
For example, if through currently explored sharing chains, the disclosure probability is as
high as 99%, it is not necessary to keep checking remaining sharing routes.
The complexity of our probability calculation algorithm is O(n) as each node in the
personal image sharing graph is first visited once during the personal image sharing graph
extraction and then calculated once in the priority queue.

3.3. PRIVACY HARMONIZATION AMONG MULTIPLE USERS
In the previous sections, we have discussed how to handle a photo with a single
owner. Indeed, the risk estimation algorithm can be easily extended to address the policy
harmonization issues occurring in a photo with multiple owners. It is common that different
users may have different privacy preferences regarding the same photo. Consider the
example when there is a group photo of Alice, Bob and Mary. Alice would like to share
the photo with her family members only, while both Bob and Mary would like to share the
photo with their close friends. It is possible that some of Bob and Mary’s close friends are
also Alice’s friends who will be able to view Alice’s photo although Alice’s initial intention
is to share only within her family. Our goal is to estimate the risk of privacy breach due
to such difference. Our system will calculate the disclosure probability of the photo being
seen by people who are in Alice’s contact list but not her family members due to the sharing
activities from Bob and Mary. We will present the estimated risk to all the photo owners so
that they can refine their privacy policies.
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In order to achieve the above goal, instead of calculating disclosure probabilities for
an individual photo owner as discussed in the previous sections, we need to calculate the
following disclosure matrix.
Definition 7 (Disclosure Matrix) Let u1 , ..., un denote the group of people depicted in a
photo img, and Pol1 , ..., Poln denote the policies belonging to each photo owner, respecÐ
tively. The disclosure matrix is defined below, where ui j ∈ nw=1 Uw+ /{u1, ...un }.
ui1
u1 P(U1− |ui1 )


u1 P(U2− |ui1 )


... 
...

un P(Un− |ui1 )

ui2

...

uik

P(U1− |ui2 )

...

P(U2− |ui2 )

...

...

...

...

...

P(U1− |uik )


−
P(U2 |uik )



...


P(U2− |uik )

The main idea underlying the disclosure matrix is to check the potential privacy breach that
may be caused by the union of the groups of people in all the photo owners’ sharing list.
After the calculating the disclosure matrix, we will identify and suggest the photo owners
to remove potentially high-risk sharing activities. The following is an illustrating example.
Suppose that a photo has three owners: u1 , u2 and u3 . The sharing lists in the photo
owners’ policies are the following:
Polu1 = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 , u5 }
Polu2 = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 , u6 }
Polu3 = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u5 , u7 }
The corresponding disclosure matrix considers the unions of the sharing list excluding the
photo owners themselves who are assumed to have full access to the photo. Assume that
we obtain the probabilities as shown in the following:
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u4

u5

u6

u7


u1 0.1


u2 0.1


u3  0

0.9

0.05

0.95

0.8

0.85

0.2


0


0.1


0.3

From the above disclosure matrix, we can see that P(U1− |u5 ), P(U2− |u5 ), and P(U3− |u5 ) are
very high (i.e., above a given privacy threshold), which means the risk that people in the
non-sharing lists of all the photo owners may see this photo due to the further propagation
from u5 . Therefore, our REMIND system will suggest all the photo owners to remove
u5 from their sharing list. In addition, user u2 ’s sharing with with u6 may cause potential
privacy breach for him/herself, thus, we would suggest u2 to remove u6 from the sharing list.
If all the users agree with suggestions, the policy harmonization will result in the following
new policies:
Pol’u1 = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 }
Pol’u2 = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 }
Pol’u3 = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u7 }

3.4. POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENT
Our system can be further enhanced to provide more fine-grained and precise privacy alerts by pre-processing statistic information collected by the social media provider.
Specifically, images can be first clustered based on their content (49; 58). Then, the image
sharing statistics will be linked to each particular type of images of a user instead of all. For
example, photos which are categorized as "funny" are more likely to propagate throughout
a much larger portion of the social network than photos which are categorized as "normal
daily life". To handle such additional sharing information only requires a minor modification of the previously discussed probability calculation algorithm. The minor change lies in
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Table 1. User Response to Different Scenarios
Privacy Breach Probability
Scenario 1 (Single-owner photo, undesired disclosure to family)
Scenario 2 (Single-owner photo, undesired disclosure to friend)
Scenario 3 (Multi-owner photo, undesired disclosure to manager)

90%
61%
78%
85%

50%
57%
73%
80%

10%
34%
31%
68%

the input parameter to the algorithm. With the fine-grained sharing information, we update
Ψ by adding the image type information, i.e., Ψ = {ψ(uo,t yp):ui →u j }. Next, when it comes
to the probability calculation, only those Ψ which contain the same image type as the one
under consideration will be considered.

4. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, we present our experimental studies that evaluate both effectiveness
and efficiency of our proposed approach. Specifically, we conducted user studies to see how
people would react when presented a probability score of their privacy breach as computed
by our system. The goal is to validate the usefulness of our proposed REMIND system.
Next, we tested the performance of our system by using real social network datasets with
various sharing scenarios. The second set of experiments aims to validate the efficiency of
our proposed system.

4.1. USER STUDY
This user study aims to investigate how a typical user would react if the user
knows that sharing with someone may cause a privacy breach with different disclosure
probabilities. We created an online survey which asked for demographic information,
photo sharing preferences, and then presented users with various sharing scenarios. In what
follows, we first describe the demographics information of people who participated in the
user study, and then analyze the results of the users’ responses.
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4.1.1. Setup and Survey. The user study involves 104 users, including approximately 30% female and 70% male. Their ages range from 18 to over 50. All of the 104 users
have at least one social media account with about 71% of them have more than 2 accounts.
When asked how often they shared images on social media, more than half said they share
regularly with 6% admitting they share images every day, and over half of the participants
have between 50 to over 200 images. To understand how conscious the participants were
about the privacy of their images, we asked them whether they often designate a group
of people that they would like to share when uploading a photo. Although about 72% of
participants answered yes, we can see there is still a good percentage (28%) of users who
may not be aware of privacy risks which makes it important to have a system that can help
remind these users about the potential privacy breach.
Moreover, even users who set up the privacy configurations during the photo sharing,
they still do not have the knowledge what would be the final audience of their images as their
friends may re-share the received images. To get an idea of how much of an impact that
the social network connections can make on a user’s privacy, we asked how many contacts
each user had in their social media accounts. 53% of the participants claim to have between
100 to 500 contacts while 21% claim to have more than 500 contacts. Imagine that even
half of those contacts sharing the images they see to their own additional contacts, we can
see how quickly an image can spread which may result in undesired privacy breach that the
photo owners do not anticipate.
4.1.2. Scenarios. After surveying the participants’ common practices in the social
media sites, we next present them three different scenarios to learn how they may react if
they know the probabilities of their photos being seen by unwanted people.
Scenario 1: Suppose that you are going to post a picture of yourself doing extreme
sports such as surfing. You know your parents (or close family members) always try to
convince you to give up these extreme sports for safety concerns, so you are not planning
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to share the photo with your parents (or close family members), but only with your surfing
club members. However, one of the surfing club members, Erica, is actually a colleague of
your parents’ (or close family members’) friends.
Scenario 2: Suppose that you are going to post a picture of yourself in a party and
share it with some of your close friends. One of your friends in your sharing list, Erica, is
also a friend of Bob who you do not wish to see your photo for some reasons.
Scenario 3: Suppose that you are going to post a picture of you and your best friend
Mary in funny costumes (such as shown in the photos) with your family members. Mary
does not wish her manager to see this. However, your cousin, Erica, knows some of Mary’s
colleagues who may know Mary’s manager.
The first two scenarios are regarding single-owner photos and the last scenario is
about multi-owner photo. For each scenario, we present sample photos to the participants
to help them better understand the scenarios. Then, we ask whether they would consider
excluding Erica from their initial sharing lists if they know there is 90%, 50%, or 10%
chance that the photo may be disclosed to unwanted people by Erica. Table 1 reports the
percentage of participants who responded positively that they would change their initial
privacy settings as suggested. From the table, we can clearly observe an increasing trend
of privacy concerns when the relationship between the photo owner and the unwanted
person becomes loose. Specifically, 61% of participants said they would not share with
Erica if there is 90% chance that the photo may be disclosed to their close family members
who are not in the initial sharing list; the percentage jumps to 78% when there is 90%
chance of disclosure to the photo owner’s friend who is not supposed to see the photo; the
percentage further increases to 85% when it is about the disclosure to the photo owner’s
manager. Such results essentially conform with most people’s common practice as we
are less concerned about our privacy within the family than in the working environments.
The second observation is that the percentage of participants who would like to change
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the privacy settings decreases with the disclosure probability. For example, when there
is only 10% chance of disclosure to undesired people, only around 30% of people chose
to restrict the privacy settings in the first two scenarios. There are still a high percentage
(68%) of people would like to prevent their manager from seeing the photo even there is
only 10% chance of disclosure. This is understandable since the privacy risk with respect
to the manager may lead to severe impact on the career development, and hence people
would not want to take much risk. Based on these responses, we envision that our proposed
REMIND system would have a good number of customers when adopted by the social
media providers.
To be even more clear about the usefulness of our REMIND system, at the end
of the user study, we directly asked the participants if they would like to have such kind
of privacy breach reminder provided by social websites. We have 73% of participants
responded that they are interested in using this kind of system. It is interesting to note that
this percentage matches the percentage of participants who answered that they usually set
up privacy settings in the social networks. It indicates that users who are concerned about
their privacy are very likely to adopt our proposed REMIND system to further enhance
their privacy protection. For people who do not care about privacy issues much, we feel
that our REMIND system could play an important role in gradually educating them the
importance of privacy protection via constant privacy breach alerts. To sum up, there is a
large percentage of people who may benefit from our proposed REMIND system to gain
better privacy protection.
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4.2. EFFICIENCY STUDY
After the user study which validates the usefulness and potential market of our
proposed REMIND system, we proceed to evaluate the efficiency of our approach. Since
our probability model looks into large-scale historical image sharing data and convoluted
social networks, it is critical that the disclosure probability can be computed in a real-time
manner to provide the users an immediate reminder when they are uploading new photos.
To examine the efficiency, we test our approach in real social networks released by
Facebook and Twitter (28). Since current social mediate sites only release the social network
Table 2. Real Social Network Datasets
Dataset
Total number of nodes
Total number of edges
Average degree
Maximum degree

Facebook
3,908
168,194
43
293

Twitter
81,306
1,768,149
21
1635

connections as shown in Table 2, but not the image sharing statistics yet, we simulate a
variety of scenarios in terms of image sharing on these real social networks as described
in Definition 4. It is worth noting that although the image sharing statistic information is
synthetic, it does not affect the efficiency test since the social network topology is real and
our sharing parameters cover a wide range of possible sharing scenarios. Specifically, we
first generate a random number of photos ranging from 100 to 1000 for each user. Then,
for each user, we randomly select a group of his/her friends to share certain percentage of
the photos. The receivers of the shared photo will forward a random number of received
photos to a random number of their friends. In this way, the photos are propagated in the
social network similar to the real world scenario. We control the propagation by setting
the maximum number of hops to forward the photos since a personal photo may not be
interesting to people who have almost no relationship with the photo owner. We vary
the number of people in the initial sharing list. We also vary the speed of image sharing
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Figure 11. Effect of the Number of the Hops

convergence as a photo may becomes less interesting to people who are farther away from
the photo owner. The following subsections elaborate the detailed experimental settings for
each round of experiments and report the corresponding results.
4.2.1. Effect of the Number of Propagation Hops. In the first round of experiments, we evaluate the effect of the number of image propagation hops ranging from 1 to
5. When there is only one hop, the photo owners share the photos with their direct friends
and their friends will not forward the photos to anyone else. When there are five hops, the
photos will be forwarded by the photo owners’ friends to the friends’ friends until 5 hops.
The reason to choose 5 hops is based on the "six degrees of separation" theory (55) that
any two users can be connected through 5 acquaintances, and we choose one degree less
to avoid the photos being propagated in the whole social networks which loses the privacy
protection sense.
Figure 11 reports the average time taken to compute the disclosure probability of
a photo owner’s friend who is not in the initial sharing list. We can observe that the
calculation takes less than 1s in all cases for both the Facebook and Twitter datasets. The
efficiency could be attributed to the extraction of the personal sharing graphs as well as the
probability serialization algorithm, both of which help reduce the amount of users (nodes
in the social network) to be examined and calculated. Moreover, we also observe that the
calculation time increases when the photos are propagated through more hops. The reason
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is that the more hops, the more users may receive the shared photos, resulting in various
sharing chains and loops which takes time to calculate. Actually, the average disclosure
probability of the friends who are not in the initial sharing list also increases with the hops.
4.2.2. Effect of the Number of Friends in the Initial Sharing List. In this round
of experiments, we fix the image propagation hops to 3 and vary the number of friends in the
initial sharing list from 50 to 200. As shown in Figure 12, the average time to calculate the
disclosure probability for a user in both datasets can be done in just a few milliseconds. This
again proves the efficiency of our algorithm. In addition, we also observe that the calculation
time increases with the size of the sharing list. This is because the more people in the initial
sharing list, the wider audience the photos may reach, which leads to a complicated sharing
graph. As a result, there may be more ancestor nodes to be computed before finalizing a
user’s disclosure probability. Note that the wider audience also means the corresponding
increase in the average disclosure probabilities.
4.2.3. Effect of the Sharing Convergence Speed. Finally, we evaluate the effect
of the sharing convergence speed. We simulate this by decreasing the number of friends
to share the photos at each hop. Specifically, the statistic sharing information is generated
by allowing each user to share the photos with 75 friends. For each friend who received
the photo, he/she forwards the photo to a smaller number of friends, e.g., 20% less of the
previous hop. The sharing stops when reaching the third hop. Figure 13 shows the average
probability calculation time for each user. Observe that the calculation time decreases when

Figure 12. Effect of the Size of the Initial Sharing List
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the sharing convergence speed increases. This is because the number of people in the
sharing list at each hop decreases, and hence the overall size of the sharing graph decreases
too. In other words, the smaller the scope of the sharing, the faster the calculation. Also,
the smaller sharing scope, the lower the average disclosure probabilities.

Figure 13. Effect of Sharing Convergence Speed

5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel risk reminder system that offers the social network
users a quantitative view of their image sharing risks due to friend-to-friend re-sharing. Our
proposed REMIND system is based on a sophisticated probability model that models the
large-scale image sharing statistic information and captures the complicated sharing propagation chains and loops. Our system also addresses the policy harmonization challenges
in multi-owner photos. We have carried out both user studies and performance studies to
validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
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SECTION

3. CONCLUSIONS

More than ever before, our growing population is using all sorts of devices to connect
and communicate with people from all over the world. They are sharing their locations,
their images, and using hand held computers to find the things they are looking for, get
directions, and make recommendations. All of this information can easily lead to the loss
of privacy for many users as we have seen in recent years with data breach after data breach.
Controlling what information is released is already difficult, but also controlling how far it
goes once online is impossible.
The potential benefits are impossible to ignore, however. This information could
be used to plan critical infrastructures, route emergency vehicles, improve conveniences,
and so much more. The volume of data being produced is overwhelming due to current
algorithms however, and require a new approach that can make the most use of the data
while also maintaining the privacy of the users producing it.
This collection of work has provided improvements that not only can handle large
volumes of data quickly, but also maintain the privacy of all users associated with the data.
This work is easily deployable to real world environments and brings our social nature and
technology closer to both being safe, and helping the greater needs of society. As a whole,
it has shown that using data for real world improvements is not only possible, but that it can
be done without sacrificing safety.
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In the MELT paper (the third paper) in this thesis, the author presented a summary
of the complexity analysis of the algorithms for the system. In this appendix, the author
presents more detail to the complexity analysis to facilitate better understanding.
• Round1Anal ysis : For the first round, recall that we:
1. Calculate which partition a trajectory belongs to
2. Output Trajectories and roads with their assigned partition
3. Cluster identical trajectories and roads
For this analysis:

c = Average nodes in a trajectory
n = Number of trajectories in data
x = Number of map partitions the data will be divided into
We can say that the time for round one is:
cn+n
x

where cn represents looking at each node in a trajectory, n represents outputting each
trajectory, assuming none are grouped for worst case, and x represents each partition
has its own reducer working in parallel.
• Round2Anal ysis : For the second round, we:
1. Identify infrequent roads
2. Remove infrequent roads from trajectories
3. Divide data into branches and output
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For this analysis, we add the following terms:

m = Number of roads in data
i = Number of mappers running in parallel
j = Number of branches to divide data into
k = k Anonymity privacy threshold
With this, we add the following to our complexity:

+

m
i

where

m
i

cn
i

represents the time to identify infrequent roads among all the roads and

cn
i

represents the time to remove those infrequent roads from the trajectories since we
look at each road in them. This assumes the worst case of no duplicate trajectories at
this point. Also at worst case, we can assume only one reducer is operating and no
more than k similar trajectories in any group, or branch. This means that one reducer
is processing the maximum number of branches itself.
n∗ nk
j

The above equation represents the time for each trajectory to be compared with each
other cluster of similar trajectories and assuming it does not match and creates its
own. j is arbitrary and constant, so the equation can be reduced to
of nk .
Therefore in round 2, we see:
m
i

+

cn
i

+

n2
k

+

n
k

n2
k

with an I/O cost
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We assume there are n infrequent roads, meaning every trajectory will need to be
changed. In the third term, realistically, there is never a single reducer working and
the chances of even clusters and every trajectory checking every cluster and reaching
the end every time is very small. It would be considered an extreme outlier case. In
practice, this term is reduced to

n
k

to be realistic. Therefore, the actual round two

m
i

+

result to be realistic would be:
cn
i

+

n
k

+

n
k

• Round3Anal ysis : In the third round, we build small cluster trees, locate the cluster
each trajectory belongs to, and output the final anonymized dataset. We start with:
nlog(cn)
jx

+

cn
x

+

n
k

where the first term represents finding a cluster for each trajectory to be assigned
to. Since we look at individual nodes in the cluster, we assume we look at all
nodes for worst case. This task is split up over j branches being processed in
batches over x reducers in parallel. The second term shows us the time to calculate
the representative trajectory for those clusters looking at the nodes, and the last term
represents outputting the anonymized dataset assuming all trajectories are split evenly
into k clusters and all clusters meet our privacy threshold so no data is lost.
• FinalSummar y : From these three rounds, we have:
m
Round 1( cn+n
x ) + Round2( i +

cn
i

+

n
k

+ nk ) + Round3( nlog(cn)
+
jx

When we assume constants are 1 and toss them, we are left with:

8n + nlog(n) → O(n + nlog(n))

cn
x

+ nk )
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